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Deontay Wilder secured a split‑decision win over Derek Chisora in London on Saturday, prompting the former WBC champion to directly challenge Anthony Joshua for a long‑awaited heavyweight bout.As Wilder exited the arena, he walked past Joshua, exchanged a fist‑bump, and declared, “Let’s do it.” The American added, “I’m ready for whoever is in the heavyweight division. Call me Mr Clean because I want to clean up the whole division.”Wilder, who holds a record of 45‑4‑1 with 43 knockouts, faced a resilient Chisora who fought his 50th professional contest. The British veteran, aged 42, fell to a split decision with judges scoring the bout 115‑111, 112‑115 and 115‑113 in Wilder’s favour.Joshua, who last fought in December when he knocked out Jake Paul, has since recovered from a serious car accident in Nigeria that claimed two of his close friends. Promoter Eddie Hearn told Fight Hub TV that Joshua would have “no problem” taking the fight, noting the British boxer stared at Wilder “ice‑cold” but would accept the challenge.Historically, Wilder was the WBC champion when Joshua held the WBA, IBF and WBO belts, but a unification bout never materialised after Wilder’s loss to Tyson Fury and Joshua’s defeat to Oleksandr Usyk, who later unified the titles by beating Fury in May 2024.Chisora, whose record stands at 36‑14 with 23 knockouts, acknowledged the end of his fighting career after the loss. Speaking beside his son Zion, he said, “I’m tired now. I can’t do it any more… I’ve had a great career.” While he hinted he might stay involved in boxing in another capacity, he stopped short of confirming a comeback.The potential Wilder‑Joshua clash now looms as the heavyweight division seeks a new marquee matchup, with both fighters positioning themselves as the next dominant force.

The US labor market demonstrated unexpected strength in March, with the unemployment rate dropping to 4.3% despite concerns over economic instability and the ongoing conflict with Iran. According to the US Bureau of Labour Statistics, non-farm payrolls grew by 178,000 jobs in March, rebounding from a downwardly revised loss of 133,000 jobs in February.The healthcare sector led the gains, adding 76,000 jobs in March, significantly higher than the 29,000 average monthly increase over the last year. This surge follows a large-scale nursing strike that ended on February 24, which had temporarily removed over 30,000 healthcare workers from payrolls.The construction sector also saw notable growth, with 26,000 jobs added in March. Additionally, the transportation and warehousing sector grew by 21,000 jobs over the previous month, although it has experienced an overall loss of 139,000 jobs since February 2025.In contrast, the federal government, the largest employer in the US, continued to shrink, cutting 18,000 federal employee positions in March. This marks a 355,000 job decline from the same period last year.The White House has praised the jobs report as evidence that President Trump's policies are stimulating the domestic economy. Kush Desai, White House deputy press secretary, stated that the March jobs report 'blew out expectations' with strong construction job growth and a surge in manufacturing job creation.However, experts warn that the impact of the US conflict with Iran, dubbed Operation Epic Fury, is not yet fully reflected in the job numbers. Economists at JPMorgan cautioned that negative payroll readings could become more common, and Angela Hanks, chief of policy programmes at The Century Foundation, noted that wage growth has stalled, and oil prices are skyrocketing, threatening to weaken the job market.The economic uncertainty is also affecting US consumers, with the University of Michigan's consumer sentiment survey dropping by 6% in March to its lowest level since December 2025. Furthermore, the average price for a gallon of petrol has increased to $4.09 ($1.08 per litre), up from $3.10 ($0.82 per litre) this time last month.

When President Donald Trump inaugurated Operation Epic Fury with Israel on 28 February, his administration outlined broad goals: neutralise Iran’s missile programme, cripple its navy and prevent a nuclear breakout. Within a month those objectives morphed, expanded and at times directly contradicted each other. On 29 March, aboard Air Force One, Trump told reporters that Iran had accepted most of Washington’s 15‑point demand list, conveyed through Pakistan, and even shipped oil to the United States as a goodwill gesture. In the same interview he floated the idea of seizing Kharg Island—the hub for 90 % of Iran’s oil exports—stating, “maybe we take Kharg Island, maybe we don’t. We have a lot of options.” The following day, 30 March, Trump posted on Truth Social that the United States was in “serious discussions with a new, more reasonable regime” in Tehran and claimed “great progress.” He simultaneously warned that, absent a swift deal, the U.S. would destroy Iran’s power plants, oil wells, Kharg Island and even its desalination facilities, and would force the Strait of Hormuz to reopen immediately. By 31 March, with U.S. gasoline prices climbing above $4 per gallon, Trump hinted at a rapid withdrawal, saying the U.S. would leave Iran “within two or three weeks.” He told European allies that if they needed oil or gas they could “go up through the Hormuz Strait” on their own, and rebuked the United Kingdom for not standing up for itself. On 1 April, Trump claimed on Truth Social that Iran’s new leadership had requested a U.S. cease‑fire, but only after the Hormuz Strait was “open, free, and clear.” He reiterated that the war was “not about oil,” yet threatened to blast Iran’s electric grid “back to the stone ages.” Iran’s foreign ministry dismissed the cease‑fire request as “false and baseless,” and the Revolutionary Guard warned the strait remained under its control. Following a U.S.–Israeli strike that demolished a bridge between Tehran and Karaj on 2 April, Trump posted that the next targets would be “bridges, then electric power plants,” signalling an escalation despite earlier talk of withdrawal. Finally, on 3 April, he suggested that reopening Hormuz and seizing Iranian oil could become a “gusher for the world,” a stark reversal of his earlier assertion that the conflict had nothing to do with oil. These rapid shifts illustrate a pattern of policy flip‑flopping that complicates diplomatic efforts, fuels market uncertainty, and raises questions about the strategic coherence of the U.S. approach to the Iran war.

At the start of 2026 Pakistan was sitting on a surplus of imported liquefied natural gas (LNG). Three consecutive years of falling demand – from a peak of 8.2 million tonnes in 2021 to 6.1 million tonnes by late 2025 – were driven by cheap solar panels and reduced industrial activity. The government responded by quietly selling excess cargoes abroad and shutting down domestic wells to avoid over‑pressurising pipelines. Any gas that could not be diverted would have been pushed into household networks at a loss, adding billions to the sector’s crippling debt. Everything changed on 28 February when the United States and Israel launched the "Epic Fury" operation against Iran. The strikes killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and targeted missile sites, air defences and military infrastructure. Iran retaliated with hundreds of missiles and drones, choking traffic through the Strait of Hormuz – a chokepoint for roughly 20 % of global oil and gas. As part of its retaliation, Iranian drones hit Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City on 2 March, the world’s largest LNG export hub. Qatar, the second‑largest LNG exporter after the United States, declared force majeure and halted all production, releasing it from contractual delivery obligations. The fallout was immediate. Qatar’s forced shutdown cut its LNG output by 17 % and disrupted the supply chain that fuels Pakistan, which sources almost all of its imported gas from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Pakistan’s LNG arrivals plummeted from 12 shipments in January to just two in March. Monthly cargo data from the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) show that the country received between eight and twelve shipments a month through 2025, but only two arrived after the conflict began. Price pressure followed. On 13 February state‑owned Pakistan State Oil and Pakistan LNG Limited bought eight cargoes at an average of $10.47 per MMBtu (totaling $257.1 million). By 12 March the two cargoes that did arrive cost $12.49 per MMBtu – a 19 % increase in just one month. Long‑term contracts have left Pakistan with little flexibility. Two government‑to‑government agreements with Qatar, spanning 15 and 10 years, commit the country to nine shipments a month. Even as domestic demand fell – LNG’s share of Asian markets dropped from ~30 % in 2020 to ~18 % in 2025 – the contracts remained binding. Solarisation has been a double‑edged sword. By 2025 Pakistan installed 34 GW of solar capacity, with about 25 GW feeding the national grid, driving an 11 % decline in overall electricity demand between 2022 and 2025. Gas‑fired power plants built for imported LNG are now under‑utilised, especially during daylight hours. Analysts warn that the surplus was predictable. “Pakistan’s energy planning has been locked into long‑term contracts with little room for adjustment,” says Haneea Isaad of the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA). The resulting circular debt now stands at 3.3 trillion rupees (≈ $11 billion), and the government is negotiating to off‑load 177 unwanted shipments worth $5.6 billion through 2031. With Qatar’s LNG shipments effectively halted, the country faces a potential shortfall of more than 21 % of its power generation capacity. The National Electric Power Regulatory Authority confirmed that LNG supplies are under force majeure, while coal imports from South Africa and Indonesia continue. To mitigate the gap, Pakistan is reviving domestic gas production that had been throttled during the surplus period. Roughly 350–400 million cubic feet per day of domestic gas were previously held back for LNG imports, now being released to the grid. Nevertheless, analysts caution that even with restored domestic gas, imported coal and hydropower, “the energy shortage may persist, especially during the peak summer months.” Summer pressure is already building. The State of Industry Report 2025 recorded peak electricity demand of over 33,000 MW last summer, while winter demand sits around 15,000 MW, helped by solar generation of 9,000–10,000 MW daily. Furnace oil, the primary backup fuel, now costs 35 rupees per unit (≈ $0.12), more than double since the Strait of Hormuz disruption. Consumers with grid electricity face higher bills and possible outages; industrial users reliant on gas risk production cuts; those equipped with rooftop solar and battery storage are best insulated. “Returning to the spot market is unlikely given Pakistan’s dire financial position, and competing with wealthier nations would price the country out,” Isaad warns. “The realistic outcome may be planned load‑shedding of two to three hours daily.”

The United States is expanding its military footprint in the Gulf as the US‑Israel war with Iran enters its second month. Since the Feb. 28 launch of Operation Epic Fury, a joint air campaign targeting Iranian military and nuclear sites, more than four weeks of strikes have resulted in thousands of casualties.Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced the deployment of a third aircraft carrier, the USS George HW Bush, joining the USS Abraham Lincoln, which is currently conducting daily combat sorties from the Arabian Sea, and the USS Gerald Ford, now under maintenance in Croatia.These carrier groups carry thousands of sailors, Marines and specialised support personnel, forming the core of the US’s power projection in the region.Carrier Strike Group (CSG) refers to an aircraft carrier plus its escort ships and support units that together function as a floating base. A typical CSG includes:An aircraft carrier60‑75 fighter jets and helicopters2‑4 Arleigh Burke‑class destroyersA guided‑missile cruiserA submarine for underwater protectionSupply shipsAs of April 1, the USS Abraham Lincoln remains the only carrier launching daily combat missions against Iranian targets, while the USS George HW Bush is en route and expected to eventually replace the Gerald Ford in the Mediterranean.Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) operates as a mini‑carrier, carrying US Marines and equipment for sea‑to‑land invasions. The USS Tripoli ARG arrived in the Middle East on March 27, and the USS Boxer ARG is expected to join the theater by mid‑April. An ARG typically comprises:Three specialised ships~2,200 Marines (a Marine Expeditionary Unit)Short‑takeoff aircraftLanding craft for beach assaultsThe key distinction: ARGs are built to land troops on shore, whereas CSGs are designed to project air power and conduct major naval warfare.A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is a rapid‑response, self‑contained force of 2,200‑2,500 Marine Corps personnel capable of combat and humanitarian missions. On Friday, US Central Command confirmed that 2,200 Marines from the 31st MEU arrived in Middle Eastern waters after departing Sasebo, Japan, on March 13. A second unit, the 11th MEU with roughly 2,500 Marines, is inbound after leaving San Diego on March 18.The Pentagon has also ordered about 2,000 soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division to move to the region, adding to the approximately 50,000 US troops already stationed in the Middle East.An MEU is organized into four elements:Command Element – ~200 personnel for planning and command‑and‑control.Ground Combat Element – ~1,200 troops centered on an infantry battalion with artillery and armoured vehicles.Aviation Combat Element – ~500 personnel operating transport helicopters, attack aircraft and Osprey tilt‑rotors.Logistics Combat Element – ~300 personnel providing up to 15 days of self‑sustainment, including medical, engineering and maintenance support.MEUs are typically deployed aboard a three‑ship ARG, which serves as a floating base. The ships include:Landing Helicopter Assault/Dock – a small carrier carrying short‑takeoff aircraft such as F‑35Bs and attack helicopters.Amphibious Transport Dock – a mid‑size vessel transporting troops and heavy vehicles.Dock Landing Ship – primarily for cargo and heavy equipment.MEUs can execute sea‑to‑land assaults, raids, evacuations, humanitarian aid and disaster‑relief operations, and they are often the first forces on the ground in emerging conflicts.The US Marine Corps maintains seven active MEUs; the 31st (Asia‑Pacific) and 11th (West Coast) are currently assigned to the Iran war. The other units are distributed as follows:East Coast: 22nd, 24th, 26th MEUWest Coast: 11th, 13th, 15th MEUAsia‑Pacific: 31st MEUTypically, three MEUs are forward‑positioned at any time, rotating through deployments in the Mediterranean, Gulf and Asia‑Pacific regions.Historically, MEUs have played pivotal roles in US operations: during the 2001 Afghanistan invasion, the 15th and 26th MEUs conducted one of the longest amphibious vertical insertions; in 2003‑2004 they helped secure Iraqi ports and fought in Fallujah; and in 2024 they provided sea‑based support for the attempted abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.

Nepal's police have arrested former Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and ex-Home Affairs Minister Ramesh Lekhak over their alleged involvement in a deadly crackdown on protesters last year.The detentions on Saturday came a day after Prime Minister Balendra Shah and his cabinet were sworn in after the first elections since the 2025 uprising that toppled Oli's government.According to The Kathmandu Post, Oli, 74, was taken into custody from his residence in Bhaktapur, a suburb of the capital, Kathmandu. Images later showed Oli walking into a hospital, dressed all in white, and surrounded by police officers.Lekhak was also detained on Saturday from another area of Bhaktapur, his personal secretary Janak Bhatta told the Post.In a statement on Facebook, new Home Minister Sudan Gurung wrote, "promise is a promise: No one is above the law"."This is not vengeance against anyone, it is simply the beginning of justice. I believe the country is now headed in a new direction," said Gurung.Oli has yet to issue a statement regarding the arrest.At least 77 people were killed in the anticorruption uprising on September 8-9, 2025, which began over a brief social media ban but tapped into longstanding fury over economic hardship.At least 19 young people were killed in the crackdown on the first day of protests.The demonstrations spread nationwide the following day as parliament and government offices were set ablaze, resulting in the government's collapse.During the caretaker administration, a government-backed commission into the deadly uprising recommended the prosecution of Oli and other senior officials.Its report said it was "not established that there was an order to shoot", but said "no effort was made to stop or control the firing and, due to their negligent conduct, even minors lost their lives".Oli has previously denied ordering security forces to open fire on protesters. During his failed bid for re-election in the March 5 poll, he blamed "infiltrators" for the violence.Prime Minister Shah, 35, a rapper-turned-politician, and his Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) won a landslide victory in parliamentary elections this month on a platform of youth-driven political change.Shah challenged and defeated Oli in the four-time ex-prime minister's own constituency.At Shah's first cabinet meeting on Friday, it was decided to implement the recommendations made by the investigative commission.

Islamabad has re‑emerged as a pivotal conduit between Washington and Tehran, delivering a U.S. 15‑point cease‑fire proposal on March 25, 2026, as the US‑Israeli campaign against Iran enters its second month. Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar confirmed that Pakistan is transmitting the proposal, with Turkey and Egypt offering additional diplomatic backing. Chief US negotiator Steve Witkoff later verified Pakistan’s role as a messenger, and President Donald Trump announced a 10‑day pause on planned strikes against Iranian power plants, citing a request from Tehran. Iran has denied direct talks, yet the pause marks the second deferment of Trump’s original threat, underscoring Pakistan’s function as a key diplomatic facilitator in a high‑stakes conflict. The pattern is not new. In August 1969, President Nixon tasked Pakistan’s military ruler Yahya Khan with opening a channel to Beijing. Two years later, a secret flight carried U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from Islamabad to China, paving the way for Nixon’s historic 1972 visit and the eventual U.S. recognition of the People’s Republic of China. Analysts note that Pakistan’s unique position—maintaining working ties with both Washington and Beijing—made it the only trusted intermediary capable of handling such a sensitive mission, a view echoed by former ambassador Masood Khan. Beyond the Cold‑War episode, Pakistan has repeatedly leveraged its geography and Muslim‑world connections. It served as the primary conduit for U.S., Saudi and Chinese support to the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s, helped broker the 1988 Geneva Accords that ended the Soviet occupation, and hosted the 2015 Murree talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government. During the 2020 Doha Agreement, Pakistani pressure on the Taliban was cited by U.S. envoy Zalmay Khalilzad as instrumental, though the rapid U.S. withdrawal and subsequent Taliban takeover left Pakistan’s long‑term interests ambiguous. Efforts to mediate Saudi‑Iran tensions have been less fruitful. In 2016, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s shuttle diplomacy failed to produce a formal agreement, and a 2019 outreach by Prime Minister Imran Khan, prompted by President Trump, yielded no concrete outcome. When China facilitated the 2023 Saudi‑Iran rapprochement, Pakistan’s foreign office claimed it had laid the groundwork, but analysts still view the result as a Chinese‑led success. Pakistan’s brief 2005 overture to Israel, led by Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, similarly collapsed under domestic opposition, illustrating the limits of its diplomatic reach when internal politics intervene. Since the launch of Operation Epic Fury—the US‑Israeli air campaign that began in late February 2026 and resulted in the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—Pakistan’s leadership has intensified back‑channel activity. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has held multiple calls with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, while Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir spoke directly with President Trump. Both officials have also visited Saudi Arabia, where Pakistan signed a mutual defence pact in September 2025. Former ambassador Naghmana Hashmi observes that Pakistan’s diplomatic narrative is often eclipsed by conflict, yet a “quieter, more consistent thread” persists: the state’s effort to turn its strategic location and Muslim‑world ties into a lever for peace. Whether the current cease‑fire talks will yield a durable settlement remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that Pakistan enjoys a rare blend of trust from Washington, Tehran and Gulf capitals—a leverage few regional actors possess.

Katie Payne's raw and raucous one-woman play, 'My Mix(ed-Up) Tape', is a vivid and pacy exploration of a young woman's return to her Welsh roots for a cousin's wedding. Payne plays Phoebe, a complex and troubled character, navigating her past and present with fury and vulnerability.Directed by Stef O'Driscoll, the production is a tour-de-force performance that zips between characters and emotions, tackling weighty themes such as feeling left behind, failure, and the consequences of violence. The play's sharp edge is evident in its portrayal of Phoebe's struggles and her ultimate recognition of her anger as a human emotion.The production features a dynamic DJ set by DJ Onai, which soundtracks the night and adds to the play's energetic and immersive atmosphere. With its breakneck speed and wildly distinct physicality and voices, 'My Mix(ed-Up) Tape' is a must-see for theatre enthusiasts.

The US conflict in Iran, with its wide-reaching consequences for the Middle East and global economy, is being portrayed by the Trump administration in a strikingly detached and simplistic manner. The war is being likened to a video game, a spectator sport, and a social media event, complete with memes and AI-generated content.A week into the conflict, the White House uploaded a series of social media clips featuring montages of popular movies like Top Gun, Braveheart, and Breaking Bad, with captions like 'Justice the American way.' Another clip, titled Touchdown, showed NFL players tackling each other, culminating in an explosion labeled 'unclassified.' Even SpongeBob SquarePants made an appearance, asking, 'Wanna see me do it again?' followed by an explosion.A senior White House official described their approach as 'grinding away on banger memes, dude,' highlighting an 'entertainment factor' in their strategy. This approach reflects Donald Trump's and his MAGA base's tendency to view politics as a competition, where scoring, winning, and humiliating the opponent are paramount. The conflict is thus framed not in terms of death, destruction, or economic fallout but as a game of scoring points.The use of AI in the conflict has been unprecedented, with Adm Brad Cooper, Centcom commander for Operation Epic Fury, noting that AI played a crucial role in the over 5,500 strikes on Iran. AI tools can accelerate processes that used to take hours or days into mere seconds, streamlining the 'kill chain' and reducing human involvement in target selection.This detachment is further exacerbated by the remote nature of the conflict and the current information ecosystem, where events are flattened into social media feeds, making it difficult to discern reality from fiction. The glut of information, including fake footage and AI-generated content, has dulled our sensitivity to the true stakes of the conflict.The article concludes with a call to retain empathy and humanity in the face of political leaders who benefit from dehumanizing conflict and platform owners who profit from it. The challenge is to understand the human cost of the war and exercise pressure on those responsible for the suffering.