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On 31 March 2026, Al Jazeera reported that an Israeli strike hit a building located in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon. The brief notice did not provide details on casualties, damage extent, or the specific target of the attack. The incident arrives amid a historically tense backdrop between Israel and Lebanon, where cross‑border hostilities have periodically resurfaced. Even isolated strikes can have outsized diplomatic repercussions, potentially prompting retaliatory measures or diplomatic protests from Beirut. Analysts caution that such actions may further destabilise the already volatile Middle East security environment, influencing regional security calculations and possibly affecting international diplomatic efforts aimed at de‑escalation. While concrete information remains limited, the event underscores the fragility of peace in the region and the importance of monitoring any escalation that could impact broader geopolitical dynamics.

London, United Kingdom – Civil‑rights organisations and supporters of the Palestine solidarity movement allege that the British state is employing intimidation tactics following the recent re‑arrest of two young pro‑Palestinian activists who were out on bail. On Monday, 21‑year‑old Qesser Zuhrah was detained at her Watford home after posting on social media urging people to take “direct action”. Counter‑terrorism police charged her with encouraging or assisting criminal damage, a charge tied to the online post. She was granted bail again on Tuesday and is scheduled to appear in court on 17 April. Four days earlier, 23‑year‑old Audrey Corno was arrested in south London by plain‑clothes officers who claimed she had tampered with her electronic tag – a breach of bail conditions she denies. Corno said officers emerged from an undercover vehicle parked outside her home and that her tag had been offline for only 20 minutes, a duration she could not have caused. Both activists were previously imprisoned for alleged involvement in separate 2024 raids on military‑hardware manufacturers linked to the Israeli war effort, actions claimed by the direct‑action group Palestine Action. Zuhrah is part of the “Filton 24” collective accused of breaking into an Elbit Systems UK weapons factory in Bristol, while Corno faced charges related to a break‑in at GRiD Defence Systems in Buckinghamshire. Although a High Court ruling in February declared the UK’s designation of Palestine Action as a “terrorist” organisation unlawful, the government is preparing an appeal, meaning public support for the group remains illegal for now. Naila Ahmed, head of campaigns at CAGE International, described Zuhrah’s re‑arrest as part of an “active repression” of pro‑Palestine voices, arguing that the legislation is being used to criminalise political speech and dissent. She called for the abolition of terrorism laws, saying they have historically served as tools of political control rather than public protection. Human Rights Watch has echoed these concerns, noting a “disproportionate targeting” of groups such as climate‑change activists and Palestine protesters, which undermines the right to protest without fear of harassment. The arrests occur amid escalating tension between the Metropolitan Police and Britain’s sizable Palestine solidarity movement. A large march is slated for Saturday in London, where demonstrators are expected to chant slogans like “I oppose genocide, I support Palestine Action”. The Met, which had paused mass arrests after the High Court decision, has recently reversed that policy, raising the likelihood of further detentions. In parallel, a court hearing is set for Wednesday involving Palestine Solidarity Campaign’s Ben Jamal and Stop the War Coalition’s Chris Nineham, who face accusations of breaching protest restrictions in January 2025. Public sentiment appears to be shifting: a YouGov poll found that one in three Britons express “no sympathy at all” for the Israeli side after the conflict has claimed over 72,000 lives and devastated the Gaza Strip. Critics argue that the Labour government, led by Keir Starmer, has intensified its crackdown on pro‑Palestine activism, citing a wave of arrests and the ongoing proscription of Palestine Action as evidence of a broader strategy to suppress dissent.

Beirut, Lebanon – On 24 March, Foreign Minister Youssef Raggi announced that Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, was declared persona non grata and ordered to depart by 29 March. Two days after the deadline, the envoy remained in Beirut, refusing to leave. The episode unfolds against a broader conflict that has already claimed more than 1,000 lives and displaced over 1.2 million people within a single month of Israeli military action in Lebanon. It also highlights a deepening schism in Lebanese politics between supporters of the pro‑Iranian Shia militia Hezbollah and those demanding its disarmament. Imad Salamey, a political scientist at the Lebanese American University, told Al Jazeera that the ambassador’s defiance is a symptom of a larger contest over legitimacy and authority. IRGC’s Strategic Role Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) helped forge Hezbollah in 1982 as a response to Israel’s invasion. Over the decades, Tehran’s billions of dollars in funding elevated Hezbollah to Lebanon’s most powerful political and military force. Hezbollah’s popularity peaked in 2000 after driving Israeli forces from south Lebanon, but subsequent engagements—including the 2006 war, the 2008 Beirut street battles, the Syrian civil war, and the 2019 domestic protests—have eroded its broader support. When Hezbollah entered open conflict with Israel on 8 October 2023, it enjoyed limited backing beyond the Shia community. By the November 2024 cease‑fire, the group was at a low point, with Israel having killed more than 4,000 Lebanese, including leader Hassan Nasrallah and much of Hezbollah’s command. International pressure then mounted for Hezbollah’s disarmament, prompting Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun to prioritize the issue. According to several analysts, the IRGC exploited the cease‑fire lull to dispatch officials to Lebanon, restructuring Hezbollah’s command and possibly ordering its re‑entry into the war on 2 March—just days after Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was assassinated. Prime Minister Salam has publicly claimed the IRGC is “managing the military operation in Lebanon” and even accused Tehran of launching an attack on Cyprus. Ambassador Refuses to Exit In response to the perceived IRGC influence, Raggi’s declaration stripped Sheibani of diplomatic immunity. Dania Arayssi, senior analyst at the New Lines Institute, described the move as a “landmark decision” given Iran’s entrenched role in Lebanese politics. Iran’s Foreign Ministry, however, maintains that Sheibani will not depart, and Hezbollah has openly pledged to protect him, warning that any government attempt to disarm the militia will be met with “punishment.” Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri—longtime Hezbollah ally—initially backed the government’s ban on Hezbollah’s military activity after the March re‑entry, illustrating the fluidity of alliances within Lebanon’s power‑sharing system. State Authority Tested Hezbollah’s renewed campaign, which includes dozens of cross‑border attacks and direct engagements with Israeli forces on Lebanese soil, is reshaping the political calculus. The militia’s revived confidence challenges the Lebanese government’s ability to enforce disarmament. While the ambassador remains protected inside the Iranian diplomatic compound—effectively beyond the reach of Lebanese law—critics argue that Tehran’s refusal to honor the expulsion order undermines the state’s authority, already weakened by months of war. Salamey summed up the dilemma: “The state is asserting its authority on paper, but internal divisions and competing claims of legitimacy constrain its practical power, testing the limits of Lebanon’s fragile power‑sharing arrangement.”

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Al Jazeera that Tehran has been exchanging messages with the United States, either directly or via regional partners, as the US‑Israel war on Iran continues. He emphasized that these contacts do not constitute formal negotiations. "I receive messages from US special envoy Steve Witkoff directly, as before, and this does not mean that we are in negotiations," Araghchi said. He added that all communications are routed through the Foreign Ministry or security agencies, and there is no truth to claims of active talks with any US party. Reflecting on past diplomatic experience, Araghchi recalled a previous agreement—referring to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—that the United States later abandoned. "We do not have any faith that negotiations with the US will yield results; the trust level is at zero," he asserted. President Masoud Pezeshkian echoed the skepticism, stating that the US "does not believe in diplomacy" after Iran was attacked twice during prior negotiations. In a phone call with European Council President Antonio Costa, Pezeshkian said Iran possesses the "necessary will" to end the war, but insists on guarantees to prevent further aggression. US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth countered, saying Washington aims to secure a deal that would end the conflict and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, yet remains prepared to "negotiate with bombs" if needed. Addressing the strategic waterway, Araghchi noted that the strait lies within Oman’s and Iran’s territorial waters and can be used strategically. "Only for the ships of those who are at war with us, this strait is closed. That is normal during war," he explained, adding that some nations avoid the route due to security concerns and high insurance costs, while others have negotiated access. He warned that any post‑war arrangement for the strait will be decided jointly by Oman and Iran, with the potential to transform it into a "peaceful waterway." Regarding rumors of a possible US ground operation, Araghchi said Tehran is unafraid: "We are waiting for them. I don’t think they’d dare to do such a thing. There will be a lot of strength waiting for them." He affirmed Iran’s readiness to repel any ground attack. The foreign minister clarified that Iran has neither responded to nor submitted any counter‑proposals to the US 15‑point plan aimed at ending the war. The proposal, according to earlier reports, calls for Iran to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons and to limit its missile stockpile in range and quantity. Araghchi concluded that Iran will only accept an end to all attacks in the region, not merely a ceasefire, underscoring the country's firm stance amid ongoing hostilities.

The Tyre hospital in Lebanon has faced significant challenges, being hit five times since the start of Israel's attacks on the country. This escalation of violence has raised concerns about the humanitarian situation in the region.The repeated strikes on the hospital have likely disrupted medical services and put the lives of patients and staff at risk. The situation remains volatile, with ongoing tensions between Israel and Lebanon contributing to the uncertainty.

More than two years into Israel's war on Gaza, thousands of families remain in limbo, torn between unverified deaths and secret detentions.In a partially destroyed home in Khan Younis, Tahrir Abu Mady clings to the charred walls that echo the memory of her missing children.Her 20‑year‑old daughter, Malak, a university student and volunteer nurse at Nasser Hospital, vanished after briefly returning home with her 18‑year‑old brother Yousef when Israeli ground forces entered the city in 2024.Forensic teams later recovered human remains in the ruined house, prompting Gaza’s Ministry of Health to issue a death certificate for Malak, while Yousef’s fate stayed unknown.The story took a painful turn when a list of Palestinian detainees released by former prisoners included Malak’s name, marked only with “No information available,” reigniting Tahrir’s anguish.Seeking answers, Tahrir tried to hire a lawyer in Umm al‑Fahm to trace her daughter within the Israeli prison system, but prohibitive legal fees made the effort impossible.Human‑rights groups warn that Malak’s case is far from unique. Israeli forces have detained thousands of Gazans in undisclosed locations, often without charge or legal representation.Euro‑Med Human Rights Monitor researcher Maha al‑Husseini estimates around 3,000 people have been forcibly disappeared, many of whom may be dead or imprisoned, with Israeli authorities refusing to provide any information.Families are left in a state of suspended grief, unable to properly mourn or advocate for their loved ones.Today, Tahrir lives between an official death certificate and a name on a smuggled prisoner list, writing on the scarred walls: “We are still waiting for you, Malak … our white coat girl.”

Islamabad – Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar will travel to Beijing, reaffirming the “all‑weather strategic cooperative partnership” between the two nations, according to the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs.The visit follows a high‑profile quadrilateral meeting in Islamabad that brought together foreign ministers from Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, all aiming to coax the United States and Iran back to the negotiating table amid a war that has already spiked global energy prices.Despite a recent hairline shoulder fracture, Dar pressed on with the trip, signalling the urgency of Pakistan’s diplomatic push. In a March 27 call, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi praised Islamabad’s “untiring efforts to cool down the situation,” a sentiment echoed by spokesperson Mao Ning, who said China is ready to “enhance communication… for a cease‑fire and peace in the region.”Analysts argue the mission is less about collecting praise and more about testing whether Beijing will move from rhetoric to concrete action in the US‑Iran mediation. The central question: can China become an active partner rather than a silent observer?Former Wilson Center fellow Baqir Sajjad Syed explains that Dar will brief Chinese leaders on the recent Islamabad quadrilateral and seek to turn five draft principles – immediate ceasefire, resumption of talks, civilian protection, maritime security, and UN Charter compliance – into a binding framework.Pakistani scholars view the outreach as classic intermediary behaviour: Pakistan leverages China’s permanent‑member status to stay relevant, while China, unlike the United States, mainly engages with Gulf states and Tehran.Iran specialist Vali Nasr suggested Tehran may be looking for a Chinese “guarantor” for any US‑Iran deal, a premise disputed by professor Ishtiaq Ahmad, who calls the expectation “analytically weak” given China’s reluctance to back a declining regime.The strategic stakes are stark. The Strait of Hormuz moves roughly 20 % of global oil. Kpler data show China imported about 1.38 million barrels per day of Iranian crude in 2025 – roughly 12 % of its total oil imports. The IEA estimates 15 million barrels per day passed through the strait in 2025, with China and India accounting for 44 % of that flow.China‑Iran trade hit about $41.2 billion in 2025, and a 2021 25‑year strategic cooperation pact promised up to $400 billion in Chinese investment for discounted Iranian oil, much of which remains unrealised due to U.S. sanctions.Syed describes China’s motivations as “clear and self‑interested”: protecting energy security, safeguarding Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China‑Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects, and bolstering its image as a global peace broker. A prolonged war would hurt China’s economy through higher oil prices and disrupted trade routes.While Beijing is unlikely to deploy military forces, it may employ diplomatic tools – public endorsements, joint statements, and economic levers – to push for a cease‑fire. Its pragmatic stance means it will weigh the benefits of deeper involvement against the risk of being drawn into a conflict.The diplomatic backdrop includes a postponed Trump visit to Beijing and a slated summit for mid‑May, as well as a future Xi‑to‑U.S. trip, which observers say could signal a broader alignment between the two great powers.Meanwhile, the United States continues to amass forces in the Gulf, with thousands of Marines and Army troops positioned for possible ground operations, underscoring the volatility that Pakistan and China are trying to mitigate.In sum, Dar’s Beijing mission tests whether China will remain a passive supporter or become an active broker in a war that threatens global energy markets and regional stability.

President Donald Trump is reportedly weighing a request for Arab countries to fund the U.S.–Israel war on Iran, White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt told reporters on Monday. Leavitt said the president is "quite interested" in calling on regional partners to share the expense.The idea mirrors the financing arrangement of the 1990‑91 Gulf War, when a coalition of Arab and Western nations covered roughly 88% of the $61 billion cost, leaving the United States to foot only about 12%.Trump also hinted that, even if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, other export‑dependent partners should manage the crisis. The strait carries about 20% of the world’s oil and LNG shipments; its shutdown has pushed Brent crude to **$116 per barrel**, up from pre‑war levels near **$65**.Iran, meanwhile, has demanded that the United States pay reparations to Iranian victims as a precondition for any cease‑fire.So far, there is no clear commitment from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members—countries that have themselves been hit by Iranian strikes—to finance the conflict. Analysts estimate the total bill could run into tens of billions of dollars, though exact figures remain uncertain.Experts note a shift in regional attitudes: GCC states opposed the war before it began and continue to call for diplomacy, according to Zeidon Alkinani of the Arab Perspectives Institute. He added that Israel appears to be the primary driver pushing the United States into the confrontation.History shows the United States has repeatedly sought external funding for wars it leads. During the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia contributed $16.8 billion (27% of total costs) and Kuwait $16 billion (26%). Japan, Germany, the UAE and South Korea also supplied sizable sums.Post‑World War II, the U.S. administered the Marshall Plan, providing over $13 billion to rebuild Europe, while Germany and Japan paid reparations and later funded the upkeep of U.S. bases—about $1 billion annually each.In the ongoing Ukraine war, the United States once delivered the largest aid package—€114.64 billion (≈$134 billion) by mid‑2025. Since Trump returned to office in 2025, he has withdrawn **99% of U.S. support**, shifting the financial load to European allies and turning the U.S. into a major arms supplier, with weapons sales reaching a record **$318.7 billion in 2024**. Recent deals, such as a $10 billion weapons package for Ukraine financed by European partners, illustrate this new model.These precedents underscore a pattern: when U.S. leadership faces costly overseas engagements, it often looks to allies—especially those with strategic interests—to share or assume the fiscal burden.

The Strait of Hormuz, a vital passageway for nearly 20% of the world's oil supply, has become a focal point of geopolitical tensions. Any disruption in this waterway could have significant impacts on global energy markets. Three scenarios are emerging as possibilities for the Strait of Hormuz: 1. Increased Military Presence: An escalation in military presence from various nations could lead to a heightened sense of security but also risks accidental confrontations. 2. Diplomatic Efforts: Diplomatic channels could open up, aiming to de-escalate tensions through dialogue and negotiation, potentially leading to a more stable region. 3. Blockade or Closure: A blockade or closure of the strait could have severe economic consequences, including skyrocketing oil prices and disruptions to global supply chains. The situation in the Strait of Hormuz remains fluid, with global implications for energy security and international relations.