Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar Seeks Chinese Backing for US‑Iran Ceasefire Amid Middle East Turmoil

Islamabad – Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar will travel to Beijing, reaffirming the “all‑weather strategic cooperative partnership” between the two nations, according to the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The visit follows a high‑profile quadrilateral meeting in Islamabad that brought together foreign ministers from Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, all aiming to coax the United States and Iran back to the negotiating table amid a war that has already spiked global energy prices.

Despite a recent hairline shoulder fracture, Dar pressed on with the trip, signalling the urgency of Pakistan’s diplomatic push. In a March 27 call, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi praised Islamabad’s “untiring efforts to cool down the situation,” a sentiment echoed by spokesperson Mao Ning, who said China is ready to “enhance communication… for a cease‑fire and peace in the region.”

Analysts argue the mission is less about collecting praise and more about testing whether Beijing will move from rhetoric to concrete action in the US‑Iran mediation. The central question: can China become an active partner rather than a silent observer?

Former Wilson Center fellow Baqir Sajjad Syed explains that Dar will brief Chinese leaders on the recent Islamabad quadrilateral and seek to turn five draft principles – immediate ceasefire, resumption of talks, civilian protection, maritime security, and UN Charter compliance – into a binding framework.

Pakistani scholars view the outreach as classic intermediary behaviour: Pakistan leverages China’s permanent‑member status to stay relevant, while China, unlike the United States, mainly engages with Gulf states and Tehran.

Iran specialist Vali Nasr suggested Tehran may be looking for a Chinese “guarantor” for any US‑Iran deal, a premise disputed by professor Ishtiaq Ahmad, who calls the expectation “analytically weak” given China’s reluctance to back a declining regime.

The strategic stakes are stark. The Strait of Hormuz moves roughly 20 % of global oil. Kpler data show China imported about 1.38 million barrels per day of Iranian crude in 2025 – roughly 12 % of its total oil imports. The IEA estimates 15 million barrels per day passed through the strait in 2025, with China and India accounting for 44 % of that flow.

China‑Iran trade hit about $41.2 billion in 2025, and a 2021 25‑year strategic cooperation pact promised up to $400 billion in Chinese investment for discounted Iranian oil, much of which remains unrealised due to U.S. sanctions.

Syed describes China’s motivations as “clear and self‑interested”: protecting energy security, safeguarding Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China‑Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects, and bolstering its image as a global peace broker. A prolonged war would hurt China’s economy through higher oil prices and disrupted trade routes.

While Beijing is unlikely to deploy military forces, it may employ diplomatic tools – public endorsements, joint statements, and economic levers – to push for a cease‑fire. Its pragmatic stance means it will weigh the benefits of deeper involvement against the risk of being drawn into a conflict.

The diplomatic backdrop includes a postponed Trump visit to Beijing and a slated summit for mid‑May, as well as a future Xi‑to‑U.S. trip, which observers say could signal a broader alignment between the two great powers.

Meanwhile, the United States continues to amass forces in the Gulf, with thousands of Marines and Army troops positioned for possible ground operations, underscoring the volatility that Pakistan and China are trying to mitigate.

In sum, Dar’s Beijing mission tests whether China will remain a passive supporter or become an active broker in a war that threatens global energy markets and regional stability.