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Israeli military chief Eyal Zamir authorized five soldiers from the Force 100 unit to resume reserve service after the top military prosecutor dismissed all charges linked to an alleged sexual assault on a Palestinian detainee at the Sde Teiman detention camp. The decision comes while an internal military inquiry into the soldiers’ conduct remains open; Israeli Army Radio reports that some of the reservists have already been redeployed to active combat roles. In a statement cited by Haaretz, the army emphasized that “the investigation does not prevent them from continuing to serve … the command‑level investigation will be completed as soon as possible.” Charges were withdrawn last month by Israel’s senior military lawyer, ending a case that had become one of the most contentious in recent Israeli history. The original indictment alleged that the soldiers stabbed the detainee with a sharp object near his rectum, causing cracked ribs, a punctured lung and an internal tear. Prison doctor Yoel Donchin told reporters he was initially shocked by the severity of the injuries, assuming they were inflicted by a rival armed group. Military Advocate General Itay Offir explained that the indictments were scrapped due to “complexities in the evidentiary structure” and “difficulties” arising after the detainee’s release to the Gaza Strip. Human‑rights organisations, led by Amnesty International, condemned the reinstatement as “yet another unconscionable chapter” in a legal system they say routinely grants impunity for grave crimes against Palestinians. The group noted that only one Israeli soldier has ever been sentenced for torturing a Palestinian detainee. Broader reports, including a February study by the Committee to Protect Journalists, document widespread abuse—ranging from beatings and starvation to sexual assault—experienced by Palestinians held in Israeli custody.

Sanaa, Yemen – At 7 a.m., 14‑year‑old Qasim wakes, grabs a one‑metre‑by‑half‑metre white sack and heads out to collect plastic bottles, hoping to fill it by 11:30 a.m. A full sack can bring in up to 1,500 Yemeni riyal (≈ $3), which the family uses for daily meals. When Qasim returns home, he can briefly be a child again, playing football with neighbours. By evening, his 12‑year‑old brother Asem takes over the bottle‑collecting, selling the haul at night to cover dinner costs. For the siblings, school is a luxury they cannot afford. "I was in fourth grade in 2024, but I stopped because I needed to help my family," Qasim told Al Jazeera, wiping his cheeks. "Sitting in a classroom would not feed me," he added. The conflict that began in 2014 between Iran‑backed Houthis and the Saudi‑backed government has devastated Yemen’s education system. UNICEF estimates that 3.2 million school‑aged children are out of school, with another 1.5 million displaced children at risk of permanent dropout. Even though a cease‑fire was declared in April 2022, the war’s economic fallout persists. During the fourth Riyadh International Humanitarian Forum, Yemen’s Minister of Planning Waed Badhib said the war has cost the national economy **over $250 billion** and pushed unemployment to **35 %**. Parents like Qasim’s father, 48‑year‑old daily‑wage worker Abdu, no longer see education as a viable path. "Seeing a hungry child hurts more than seeing a child drop out," he said, noting that many university graduates now work as construction guards or porters. Experts warn that this short‑term coping strategy harms long‑term prospects. Mahmoud al‑Bukari, a Taiz academic, explained that forcing children into work “creates further social and economic problems for both individuals and society.” Sociology professor Afrah al‑Humaiqani stressed that denying education violates children’s rights and breeds anxiety, undermining future economic development. Infrastructure damage compounds the crisis: more than 2,400 schools are destroyed, partially damaged, or repurposed (Save the Children). Remaining classrooms are overcrowded, and teachers—many unpaid for years—are demotivated, leading to a decline in teaching quality. Fatima Saleh, a teacher in Sanaa, described educators as the "engine" of learning. "When that engine falters, students lose interest and drop out," she said, noting that unpaid salaries force many teachers to quit or seek other work. Journalist Mohammed Abdu al‑Samei argues that the cease‑fire alone cannot revive education without addressing the underlying economic collapse. International aid has also dwindled, leaving a critical funding gap for programs that once kept children in school. For Qasim, returning to a classroom is no longer realistic. He now aims to acquire a trade—painting, carpentry, or welding—to earn a living, saying, "I will not return to the classroom, but I will learn a skill that helps my family."

West Bengal’s electoral rolls have been slashed by over nine million names, representing roughly 12 % of the state’s 76 million registered voters, after the Election Commission of India (ECI) completed its Special Intensive Revision (SIR) earlier this month. The purge has hit the Muslim community hardest. In districts where Muslims form a sizable share of the electorate, deletions total 460,000 in Murshidabad, 330,000 in North 24 Parganas and 240,000 in Malda. Analysts say the pattern suggests a strategic effort to reshape the voter base ahead of the assembly election scheduled for April 23 and April 29, with results due on May 4. One of the most striking cases is that of Nabijan Mondal, 73, who has voted in every national, state and local election for the past five decades. She discovered her name missing from the new list because her voter card bears the nickname “Nabijan” while her Aadhaar and ration cards use the formal name “Nabirul.” Her husband, children and their spouses remain on the roll, leaving her unable to vote. Overall, nearly six million of the removed voters were classified as absent, shifted, dead or duplicate, while the remaining three million must appeal to special tribunals. However, the Supreme Court of India has ruled that those with pending tribunal cases cannot cast ballots in the upcoming election, though it may permit the ECI to issue supplementary lists. West Bengal’s Muslim population stands at about 25 million (27 % of the state’s 106 million residents). The Trinamool Congress (TMC), led by Mamata Banerjee, has governed the state since 2011 and relies heavily on Muslim support to counter the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Banerjee has accused the ECI of partisan bias, claiming the SIR was “selectively applied … to benefit the BJP.” Conversely, the BJP frames the revision as a necessary measure against “illegal infiltrators,” linking the exercise to concerns over cross‑border migration from Bangladesh and Rohingya refugees. Independent research by the Kolkata‑based SABAR Institute supports the allegation of disproportionate impact. In the contested constituencies of Nandigram and Bhabanipur, where the BJP’s Suvendu Adhikari is challenging TMC leaders, over 95 % of the deleted names in Nandigram were Muslims, and 40 % of deletions in Bhabanipur involved Muslim voters, despite Muslims comprising only 25 % and 20 % of the respective populations. Women appear especially vulnerable. Legal scholar Swati Narayan notes that patrilocal customs and frequent name changes after marriage create documentation gaps that the SIR process penalises. Jesmina Khatun, a 31‑year‑old from Gobindapur, lost her name over a minor spelling inconsistency in her father’s surname, illustrating how minor clerical errors can disenfranchise voters. Political commentator Yogendra Yadav warns that the SIR places an “excessive burden” on female voters, who must produce proof from their natal homes while men can rely on documents from their current residence. With tribunals unlikely to clear the backlog before polling day, thousands of eligible citizens risk being excluded from a pivotal election that could reshape the political landscape of India’s most populous state.

Fuel‑price protests have erupted across the Republic of Ireland, described by observers as the most serious civil unrest since the state’s founding in the 1920s. Demonstrators, largely farm contractors and hauliers, have staged "go‑slow" convoys on motorways, blocked ports and even targeted the country’s sole oil refinery at Whitegate, County Cork. The unrest mirrors France’s Yellow Vests movement in its focus on carbon taxes and fuel duties, but unlike the French case it is being triggered by an external shock: the closure of the Strait of Hormuz after the United States and Israel launched a military campaign against Iran in late February 2026. The strait carries roughly 20% of global oil and LNG shipments, and its blockage has precipitated a sharp rise in fuel costs in Ireland – diesel up about 28% and petrol by 25%. By the weekend, around 40% of Irish petrol stations were empty, leaving many motorists stranded. In response, the Dublin coalition government ordered the army to clear blockades and authorised the police (An Garda Síochána) to make arrests, though the total number of detainees has not been disclosed. To quell the crisis, the government unveiled a package of concessions worth nearly $600 million. The measures include a 10% discount on diesel and petrol and a postponement of a planned carbon tax, aimed at both motorists and the broader food‑production sector (farming and fishing). The Taoiseach and Tánaiste have appealed for an end to the protests and urged dialogue through representative bodies. Public sentiment is split. A poll by the Sunday Independent found that 56% of respondents initially backed the protesters, but growing disruption – such as the cancellation of scheduled surgeries and travel difficulties for the elderly – appears to be eroding that support. Analysts highlight deeper structural issues in Ireland’s agri‑economy. Patrick Bresnihan of Maynooth University warned that the protests expose “deep inequalities and contradictions” in a system dominated by export‑oriented dairy and beef production, where many workers face precarious, seasonal contracts. While the protests have not ignited a comparable far‑right surge seen in parts of Europe, commentators caution that the unrest could provide fertile ground for populist narratives. Right‑wing groups in Germany, Spain and France have previously linked agricultural grievances to broader anti‑EU sentiment, though such movements remain marginal in Ireland. In Northern Ireland, planned blockades largely failed to materialise. Minor “go‑slow” convoys caused brief diversions, but no major infrastructure was seized and only a handful of fines were issued. Experts, including Queen’s University Belfast anthropologist Dominic Bryan, suggest the limited turnout reflects a lack of cohesive demands and organizational capacity north of the border. Political fallout in Dublin includes a confidence vote survived by the coalition after Sinn Féin’s challenge, and the resignation of junior minister Michael Healy‑Rea, who was cheered by protesters outside Leinster House. Overall, the fuel‑price protests underscore how a regional conflict in the Middle East can cascade into domestic unrest in Europe, intertwining energy security, rural economics and political stability.

On Thursday, Israeli security forces conducting an operation in Nablus, a major city in the occupied West Bank, fired stun grenades at journalists covering the events. The incident was reported by multiple media outlets present on the ground. According to eyewitness accounts, reporters from local and international news agencies were positioned near the site when the grenades were deployed, causing a sudden flash and loud explosion. No serious injuries were confirmed, but the sudden blast forced the journalists to seek immediate cover and temporarily halted their reporting. Press‑freedom organizations quickly condemned the action, stating that the use of crowd‑control munitions against media personnel undermines the ability to document and verify developments in the region. The incident adds to a growing list of reported confrontations between Israeli forces and members of the press in the occupied territories. Israeli authorities have not yet released an official statement explaining the rationale behind the deployment of the stun grenades. Analysts suggest that heightened security measures during operations often lead to heightened tensions, but emphasize that protecting journalists is essential for transparent reporting in conflict zones. The episode underscores the precarious environment for journalists working in the West Bank, where the line between security operations and press freedom continues to be contested.

Alexandre Ramagem, the former head of Brazil’s intelligence agency, was released from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody on Wednesday, ending a brief detention that began after a traffic stop in Orlando, Florida.Far‑right Brazilian commentator Paulo Figueiredo confirmed the release in a post on X, stating simply, “Alexandre Ramagem is free.” A source from Brazil’s federal police, cited by Reuters, also verified the news.Ramagem, who was sentenced in September 2025 to 16 years in prison for his involvement in a coup attempt supporting former President Jair Bolsonaro, fled Brazil before beginning his term. He allegedly crossed into Guyana illegally before boarding a flight to the United States.In the United States, he was initially detained for a minor traffic violation in Orlando and subsequently transferred to ICE – a routine procedure in Florida, according to Figueiredo. The former intelligence chief also has a pending asylum application, complicating the legal landscape.The Brazilian government has long sought his return. The Brazilian embassy in Washington, D.C., filed an extradition request with the U.S. Department of State on December 30, 2025. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva publicly urged Washington to hand Ramagem over so he can serve his sentence.Despite the extradition request, ICE has not commented on the release, and Ramagem’s name was removed from the agency’s online detention list as of Wednesday.Ramagem’s conviction also led to his removal from Brazil’s Congress in December 2025, underscoring the political fallout of the coup case. The episode highlights ongoing diplomatic friction between Brazil and the United States, especially as the two nations navigate cooperation on security, immigration, and legal cooperation.For context, former President Bolsonaro is currently serving a 27‑year prison term for related offenses, a case that has drawn international attention, including past criticism from former U.S. President Donald Trump.

The Trump administration is formally enlisting foreign governments to support a sweeping reorientation of global development policy, favoring trade over aid. This initiative, set to be introduced at the United Nations later this month, aims to move away from direct aid to poor nations and towards increased trade led by private companies. According to Tommy Pigott, Principal Deputy Spokesperson at the State Department, the initiative rejects what he calls a failed aid model, emphasizing that trade and free market capitalism are the surest paths to prosperity. Pigott also criticized those advocating for 'aid not trade,' suggesting they are supporting a corrupt NGO industrial complex. The initiative's four stated aims include: advancing pro-business reforms in developing economies, facilitating government-to-private sector dialogue to attract investment, highlighting countries that have pursued free-market development, and brokering business partnerships between developing nations and US companies or international organizations. This push comes amid a broader trend of diminishing humanitarian aid globally. OECD preliminary figures show that 26 of 34 donor nations shrank their aid budgets in 2025, with significant cuts in countries like France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Chatham House estimates that the 17 largest donors are on course to cut more than $60 billion in aid between 2023 and 2026. The UK's commitment to aid is set to decrease to 0.3% of gross national income by 2027, its lowest share since 1999. A study published in The Lancet warns that sustained global aid cuts could result in at least 9.4 million additional deaths by 2030. The Center for Global Development estimates that USAID cuts alone may have already contributed to between 500,000 and a million deaths in 2025. The US mission to the United Nations is expected to host a formal signing event for the declaration before the end of April.

The sports world is reeling from the news that Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund (PIF) is pulling back its financial support for LIV Golf, a rebel tour that has been a key vehicle for the kingdom's ambitious attempts to become a leading global sports destination.Conservatively estimated to have cost Saudi Arabia over $10bn in the past five years, the slowdown in lavish spending on sport was expected, but the withdrawal of PIF's support has sent shockwaves throughout the industry. This move was first communicated to LIV executives on Monday, leaving many employees fearing for their jobs.The uncertainty is not limited to golf, with other sports administrators worried that similar cuts could be coming their way. LIV Golf's future is now in doubt, with the tour's chief executive, Scott O'Neil, failing to address the possibility of PIF's withdrawal in an email to staff on Wednesday evening.Sports executives outside golf have expressed concerns about the future, stating, 'We all went running to Saudi for a quick payday and are now wondering what the future holds.' The PIF's investment strategy now focuses on domestic benefits and building real businesses, with LIV Golf being seen as vulnerable due to its lack of profitability.The PIF's financial strategy for 2026-2030 emphasizes 'value realisation through performance, innovation, and private sector engagement.' While sport is not listed as one of PIF's six investment pillars, it will be included under the tourism, travel, and entertainment portfolio.The move towards privatization is evident, with PIF selling a 70% stake in Al-Hilal, one of its Saudi Pro League clubs, to a private company owned by Prince Al Waleed bin Talal Al Saud. Other sports, such as Esports, boxing, and mixed martial arts, are expected to continue receiving investment due to their popularity and potential for growth.The implications of PIF's shift in strategy extend beyond golf, with Newcastle United and other sports organizations potentially affected. As Saudi Arabia continues to invest heavily in certain sports, the future of others, like LIV Golf, remains uncertain.

Big Mood returns for a second season on Channel 4, aiming to blend a serious look at bipolar disorder with broad‑scale comedy. Lead actress Nicola Coughlan reprises Maggie, now emerging from a harrowing episode of lithium poisoning that left her hallucinating and confused. The debut series introduced Maggie in the throes of a manic episode, followed by a depressive crash after she stopped her medication to protect her creative output. While the first season earned praise for its insightful depiction of mental illness, the new installment quickly pivots toward slapstick scenarios – from a militant maid of honour to a secret‑husband extortion plot – that dilute the original emotional weight. Central to the drama is Maggie’s strained bond with best friend Eddie, played by Lydia West. Their friendship, already intense in season one, becomes increasingly implausible as Eddie abandons London for California without explanation. In season two, Eddie resurfaces under the control of a dubious wellness guru named Whitney, who has siphoned her finances and seeks to erase any lingering connection with Maggie. Rather than deepening the exploration of mental health, the series now focuses on a far‑cical showdown between the two women. Maggie, now in a “stable girl” routine of retinol and Hello Fresh meals, obsessively attempts to expose Whitney as a fraud, enlisting Eddie’s friend Will – a character described as “incorrigibly nice” yet treated with contempt by both protagonists. The tonal shift raises questions about the show’s core ambition. While Coughlan delivers an empathetic performance that captures Maggie’s inner turmoil, the surrounding plotlines feel disjointed and at times toxic, especially in the portrayal of the once‑intoxicating platonic romance that now appears more destructive than supportive. Humor, inherently subjective, may still resonate with viewers who appreciate the series’ millennial‑centric chaos. However, the blend of “knockabout farce” with moments of genuine drama feels uneven, suggesting that the show’s initial promise of a heartfelt, realistic bipolar narrative has been eclipsed by over‑reaching comedic contrivances. In conclusion, Big Mood season two struggles to reconcile its dual aims. The ambitious premise that once offered a nuanced look at mental illness now feels buried beneath a barrage of gimmicks, leaving audiences to wonder whether it’s time for the characters – and perhaps the series itself – to move on.