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The Treasury’s push for UK supermarkets to cap price rises on essential foods has been met with predictable horror‑squeals, yet the debate distracts from two stark realities: a steep surge in food prices and a food system increasingly vulnerable to global shocks.UK Treasury's Food Price Cap Sparks OutcrySupermarkets were described as “furious” while former Institute for Fiscal Studies heads and ex‑M&S chairs warned against price controls. The criticism, however, overlooks the fact that food prices have risen near‑40% since 2020, driven by the Iran‑Ukraine war and a forecast record‑breaking El Niño that threatens global production.Rising Global Food Costs: Near‑40% Surge Since 2020Food prices in the UK have climbed ≈40% from 2020 levels.One‑third of global fertiliser trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz.About 50% of the world’s food supply depends on artificial fertiliser.These chokepoints mean that disruptions—whether from geopolitical tensions or climate events—translate quickly into higher consumer prices.Systemic Vulnerabilities: Chokepoints and Climate ShocksChatham House identified 14 critical junctures in the food trade, from Hormuz to the Panama Canal, which carries 16% of global grain. Simultaneous shocks, such as a strong El Niño, historically raise global food prices by around 9% and have pushed millions into food insecurity.Economic Fallout: Farming Crisis and Consumer PressureUK imports ≈60% of its fertiliser and 50% of its fossil gas.Last year’s harvest values fell >20% below long‑run averages, costing farmers £828 million.Decade‑long lost revenues now total £2.3 billion.86% of farmers report extreme rainfall; 78% cite drought in the past five years.These pressures risk a market‑led system breaking down, prompting price spikes, shortages, and potential profiteering by dominant supply‑chain players.Path Forward: Rethinking Food Security and Policy OptionsAddressing the crisis will require diversifying fertiliser sources, investing in resilient domestic agriculture, and considering targeted interventions beyond blunt price caps. Without structural reforms, the UK may face prolonged stagnation as rising food costs squeeze household spending and broader economic growth.

The LeadEleven weeks after the start of the Iran war, the Strait of Hormuz has remained closed to naval traffic, bleeding the global economy far beyond the Gulf. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maintains an iron grip over this narrow, strategic waterway, while a corresponding United States naval blockade on Iranian ports has failed to reopen it.Before the war began, between 120 and 140 ships travelled through the strait each day, about half of them oil tankers carrying some 20 million barrels of oil between them. Now, only a few vessels whose owners have negotiated with the IRGC are permitted to pass.The Strategic Control of HormuzOn Wednesday, Iran said it coordinated the transit of 26 vessels through the Strait of Hormuz in 24 hours, two days after announcing the formation of the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), a new body to provide "real-time updates" on operations in the strait.Since the announcement of a temporary ceasefire between the US and Iran in April, Iran has been working on formalising a mechanism to charge a transit fee from ships crossing the critical chokepoint, through which 20 percent of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) are shipped during peacetime.Tehran has reportedly already charged fees as high as $2m per ship for transit since the war started. Even though countries opposing Tehran say this is illegal, it may still be less expensive than the overall cost of the closure of the strait each day.The Economic Cost of BlockadeNearly one-fifth of global oil and LNG exports were shipped by Gulf producers through the Strait of Hormuz before the US and Israel bombed Iran on February 28, triggering the Iranian closure of the waterway. The strait is the only waterway linking Gulf producers to the open ocean – there is no other route through which they can ship exports.About 20.3 million barrels per day of oil passed through the Strait of Hormuz in peacetime – nearly 27 percent of global maritime oil trade. The lion's share of that crude went to Asian markets.Global LNG trade has been similarly hard hit. On the day before the war broke out, Brent crude – the global benchmark for oil prices – closed at $72.48 per barrel. After Iran closed the waterway on March 4 and began attacks on vessels attempting to sail through, traffic came to a standstill, stranding about 2,000 ships on either side of the strait.In terms of lost oil revenues, this amounts to $114.8bn of losses per day. About 10 billion cubic feet of LNG per day also used to pass through the strait, worth a further $7.8bn.The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Transit FeesFor hundreds of ships stranded in the Gulf with thousands of sailors on board, the cost of remaining anchored is steep, including crew wages, loan repayments, repair and management, coupled with inflated war risk premiums.In turn, Iran has reportedly been charging up to $2m for authorisation to pass. Experts say many will see this as worthwhile purely in terms of monetary cost."There is no doubt that paying Iran is cheaper than a continuous blockade because a sitting tanker bleeds money," said Nader Habibi, an Iranian American economist."It makes sense from an economic point of view, but it is not politically feasible," he added. "The companies are under pressure from the US sanctions and not to make arrangements with Iran. This is not just a purely economic cost-benefit analysis, but long-term considerations that are taken into account."International Legal PerspectivesInternational law protects free transit through strategic waters such as natural straits like Hormuz, barring countries from imposing passage tolls even where the waterways fall entirely into territorial waters, like in the case of Hormuz.However, services such as security controls, inspections and insurance regimes can be charged for. Chargeable fees also partly depend on whether a waterway is a man-made passageway or a natural one.These are three different precedents in maritime traffic flow:Panama Canal: An artificial waterway connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Vessels pass through a unique system of locks that raise and lower vessels across elevated terrain. Since Panama built, maintains and operates the canal, it can charge transit fees based on vessel size, cargo capacity and booking priority. These range from several hundred thousand dollars per transit to some slots sold for millions of dollars.Suez Canal: Another artificial canal, linking the Mediterranean and Red seas. Egypt charges transit fees for the use of canal infrastructure, maintenance and traffic management services through the narrow waterway. Container ships and oil tankers pay from several hundred thousand dollars to more than one million dollars per voyage.Turkiye's Bosporus Strait and Dardanelles: These are different because they are natural straits, rather than man-made canals. Turkiye charges for navigation-related services such as lighthouse operations, rescue readiness, medical support and traffic management – and tightly controls ship scheduling and navigation.Regional Cooperation PossibilitiesIran's newly-formed PGSA published a new map of Hormuz, stretching from Kuh-e Mubarak in Iran to south of Fujairah, in the UAE, at the eastern entrance of the strait, and from the tip of Qeshm Island to Umm al-Quwain at the western entrance.Given how the Iran war has spilled over into the Gulf region – with the UAE taking the brunt of Iranian strikes – economist Mohammad Reza Farzanegan said "regional cooperation with Iran is the most realistic path to stable transit through the Strait of Hormuz."The UAE, Oman, Qatar and Iran will have to work together because their economies require it, he argued. A workable arrangement could include a joint maritime authority, shared monitoring, emergency coordination, environmental protection and service-based contributions for maintaining safe passage."This would give Iran a recognised role in the security of the waterway while giving Persian Gulf economies more predictability," Farzanegan added. "Such a framework is also more realistic than relying on external military enforcement, which has been more a source of trouble for these states."The Future OutlookWhile it may seem that the economics of the closure of the strait are currently skewed towards Iran, Aniseh Tabrizi, an associate fellow on the Middle East and North Africa Programme at think tank Chatham House, noted that "the economics by itself is not going to be the driver to change calculation or move from the current standpoint."She emphasized that Iran and the US need to reach a "diplomatic compromise, with other calculations linked in to the economic factor", before there can be an end to the energy supply crisis.Farzanegan added that if the world expects stable access to the Strait of Hormuz, then paying Iran could well be accepted as the price of keeping the vital waterway predictable. "From an economic perspective, a negotiated transit arrangement [with Iran] now makes more sense than continued closure," he concluded.

India’s Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) announced a series of visits to the United States, United Kingdom and Germany in early April 2026, aiming to reshape its global image as the ideological core of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) while countering accusations of involvement in violence against religious minorities.RSS Launches Western Outreach Amid International ScrutinyDate: Early April 2026 – visits to UK, US, Germany.Goal: “Dispel certain misgivings and misconceptions” about the RSS, according to General Secretary Dattatreya Hosabale.Key engagements: Meetings with Chatham House, Hudson Institute, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, and dinners with UK parliamentarians from Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties.Quantifying the Surge in Hate Incidents2025 hate speech incidents: Rose 13 % nationwide, per the India Hate Lab.Christian‑targeted hate speech: Increased from 115 events in 2024 to 162 in 2025 – a 41 % jump.Context: Majority of incidents occur in BJP‑governed states, fueling claims that the RSS‑BJP nexus fuels communal violence.Political Ramifications for India’s Hindu Nationalist NetworkThe outreach follows a November 2025 report by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) labeling the RSS as “involved in acts of extreme violence and intolerance.” Potential sanctions could threaten the RSS’s funding streams, especially from the Indian diaspora in the West.Analysts note that the RSS’s “network of right‑wing conservative organisations worldwide” could be reshaped if Western policy circles act on the USCIRF recommendation, pressuring the BJP government led by Narendra Modi to distance itself.Future Trajectory of RSS’s Global Lobbying EffortHosabale indicated plans to extend the tour to Southeast Asia and additional European capitals, suggesting a long‑term strategy to build diplomatic goodwill and pre‑empt punitive measures. If sanctions materialise, the RSS may double down on diaspora fundraising or seek alternative political allies, but sustained Western scrutiny could limit its ability to operate openly abroad.

In a rare public disciplinary action, Israel jailed two soldiers for 30 days after a video surfaced showing one of them demolishing a crucifix statue of Jesus in southern Lebanon with a sledgehammer.The Viral Sledgehammer Attack on a Jesus StatueFootage released on Monday captured an Israeli soldier striking a wooden depiction of the crucifixion with a sledgehammer, while a fellow soldier filmed the incident. The clip quickly went viral, prompting domestic and international criticism of Israel’s self‑portrayal as a protector of Christian heritage.Legal Consequences and Military DisciplineBoth soldiers received 30‑day jail sentences.A third soldier, the cameraman, was also sentenced to 30 days.Six additional soldiers were summoned for questioning.The swift punishment contrasts with the Israeli military’s typical handling of alleged violations, which often result in exoneration.Erosion of Christian Support for IsraelThe incident arrives as Israel’s broader war in Gaza and operations in Lebanon have strained its traditional Christian backing in the United States and Europe. Analysts such as Yossi Mekelberg of Chatham House note that visible accountability is crucial to retain the “Judeo‑Christian” narrative that underpins much of the Christian Zionist lobby.Recent data show a decline in Christian‑based pro‑Israel sentiment, with reports of increasing harassment of Christians within Israel and a rise in anti‑Christian incidents from 2024 to 2025.Future of Israel’s Judeo‑Christian NarrativeIf Israel continues to enforce selective discipline, it may struggle to preserve the religious goodwill that fuels political support, especially among U.S. evangelical leaders. Conversely, a consistent policy of accountability could mitigate the “war‑crimes” perception highlighted by critics.Observers predict that the Israeli government will face heightened pressure to address religious‑site violations, potentially leading to formal guidelines for troops operating in mixed‑religion areas.

Israel's increasing international isolation has led to a growing rift with European countries, who are frustrated by its actions in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran. Despite longstanding ties, European governments are finding it difficult to ignore public opinion, which has shifted against Israel. European countries, including Italy, the UK, Ireland, and Spain, have criticized Israel's actions, with some calling for a halt to its attacks on Lebanon and Iran. Analysts warn that the conflict threatens to tip the world into recession. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has responded to criticism by claiming Israel is a defender of Western values, stating that Europe has become 'afflicted by deep moral weakness'. He argued that Europe is 'losing control of its identity, of its values, of its responsibility to defend civilisation against barbarism'. Netanyahu's comments have been met with skepticism, with many pointing out that Israel's actions in Gaza and the occupied West Bank are at odds with its pretence of being a liberal democracy. Israeli academic and filmmaker Haim Bresheeth said that Israel's actions are 'not the sort of thing liberal democracies do'. The rift between Israel and Europe is expected to continue, with little chance of self-reflection or internal reckoning among Israel's political leadership. As Chatham House senior consulting fellow Yossi Mekelberg said, 'There's a sense that, if they don't like us, then we must be doing something right'.

The Trump administration is formally enlisting foreign governments to support a sweeping reorientation of global development policy, favoring trade over aid. This initiative, set to be introduced at the United Nations later this month, aims to move away from direct aid to poor nations and towards increased trade led by private companies. According to Tommy Pigott, Principal Deputy Spokesperson at the State Department, the initiative rejects what he calls a failed aid model, emphasizing that trade and free market capitalism are the surest paths to prosperity. Pigott also criticized those advocating for 'aid not trade,' suggesting they are supporting a corrupt NGO industrial complex. The initiative's four stated aims include: advancing pro-business reforms in developing economies, facilitating government-to-private sector dialogue to attract investment, highlighting countries that have pursued free-market development, and brokering business partnerships between developing nations and US companies or international organizations. This push comes amid a broader trend of diminishing humanitarian aid globally. OECD preliminary figures show that 26 of 34 donor nations shrank their aid budgets in 2025, with significant cuts in countries like France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Chatham House estimates that the 17 largest donors are on course to cut more than $60 billion in aid between 2023 and 2026. The UK's commitment to aid is set to decrease to 0.3% of gross national income by 2027, its lowest share since 1999. A study published in The Lancet warns that sustained global aid cuts could result in at least 9.4 million additional deaths by 2030. The Center for Global Development estimates that USAID cuts alone may have already contributed to between 500,000 and a million deaths in 2025. The US mission to the United Nations is expected to host a formal signing event for the declaration before the end of April.

National Gas announced that the United Kingdom will have enough gas to satisfy summer demand despite recent tensions in the Strait of Hormuz. The network, which runs the country’s gas pipelines, says domestic and Norwegian supplies will cover the low‑usage months, meaning liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports will be minimal this summer. The real challenge lies ahead. While renewable rollout is accelerating, gas will remain a core part of the UK’s energy mix for at least the next two decades. It accounts for about 37% of total gas consumption in 2024, with domestic heating being the largest single use. Replacing millions of boilers with heat pumps cannot happen quickly, especially given the current sluggish pace. Government plans for 2030 still require the full 35 GW of gas‑fired generation capacity to stay online as backup. Energy department data released in early 2025 showed gas demand “broadly stable” for the third consecutive year, representing roughly half of the nation’s 75.2% fossil‑fuel dependency. In the debate over new North Sea drilling licences, the key question is where future gas will come from. Oxford energy economist Sir Dieter Helm, speaking on a Chatham House podcast, warned that gas will dominate the energy supply for the next decade or two and that the cheapest, least polluting option is pipeline gas—not LNG. Analysis from Wood Mackenzie confirms this hierarchy. Pipeline gas from modern Norwegian platforms has the lowest carbon intensity, followed by UK North Sea pipelines. By contrast, LNG adds significant emissions during liquefaction and regasification, and US LNG is the most carbon‑intensive because much of it originates from shale gas with higher methane leakage. Wood Mackenzie’s import forecasts to 2045 paint a stark picture: if domestic production wanes, the UK could rely on US LNG for over 60% of its total gas supply by 2035. The firm notes that Middle‑East gas is geared toward Asian markets, while US cargoes are increasingly directed to Europe, raising concerns about over‑reliance on a single supplier. These projections underpin the argument for expanding UK North Sea extraction. More domestic drilling would reduce dependence on US LNG—a geopolitical risk given the United States’ tendency to use energy as a foreign‑policy lever—and would also lower the overall carbon footprint of the gas supply chain. Critics often claim that North Sea output is exported, so it does not improve national security. Two counter‑points are clear: first, gas delivered directly via pipeline to the UK network is inherently more secure than trans‑Atlantic cargoes; second, the UK could negotiate long‑term, fixed‑price contracts with producers, a model that worked well in the early days of North Sea development. None of this diminishes the importance of renewables and nuclear power. Electrification remains the long‑term goal, but gas will stay in the energy basket for years to come. Offshore Energies UK estimates that, with a pragmatic licensing approach, reliance on LNG could be limited to 6% of total gas supplies by 2035. Assuming political stalemate eases, the pending approval of the Jackdaw field—accounting for roughly 6% of current domestic production—could spark a more nuanced debate about the UK’s gas procurement strategy, moving beyond the simplistic “renewables vs. gas” narrative. Reflecting on the recent Iran‑UK conflict, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak highlighted the need for “secure, homegrown energy”. The logical follow‑up is twofold: accelerate electrification to cut gas demand, and while gas remains essential, avoid turning the UK into an “energy prisoner of the US”. Beyond the geopolitical and environmental benefits, expanding North Sea output would also support jobs, tax revenue, and the balance of payments.

On a Wednesday night, Israel launched a massive air campaign against Lebanon that resulted in the deaths of over 300 civilians and struck more than 100 targets within ten minutes, including densely populated neighborhoods in central Beirut. The operation, described by Israeli officials as the largest strike against Hezbollah since the month‑long war with Iran began, has drawn sharp international condemnation. The Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, maintains that the attacks were narrowly aimed at Hezbollah operatives who allegedly relocated command posts to civilian districts such as the Dahieh suburb. Critics, however, argue that the scale and timing of the strikes suggest a broader political motive: to disrupt the US‑Iran ceasefire negotiated by former President Donald Trump, a deal many view as unfavorable to Netanyahu. Evidence fueling this theory includes the lack of any prior warning and the targeting of locations where high‑profile Hezbollah figures were present. Among the dead was Ali Yusuf Harshi, the nephew and personal adviser of Hezbollah secretary‑general Naim Qassem, leading some observers to speculate that the operation may have been a failed attempt to eliminate Qassem himself—mirroring Israel’s 2024 alleged assassination of former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Hezbollah officials later claimed they had been “notified of a ceasefire” and were committed to it from the morning of the attack, yet by Thursday both sides were again exchanging heavy fire. Netanyahu’s public justification for the strike—citing the killing of an aide to Qassem—appeared thin, reinforcing the perception that the operation was designed to act as a “spoiler” to a ceasefire he had previously opposed. Analysts at the Soufan Center in New York warned that, even if Lebanon is technically outside the ceasefire framework, the sheer magnitude of Israel’s assault will be viewed as escalatory. They argue the strikes serve a dual purpose: to widen the rift between Iran and its proxies and to retaliate against what Israel perceives as being sidelined in the ceasefire negotiations. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian condemned the attacks, stating they breach the ceasefire agreement and render ongoing talks meaningless. He warned of a possible Iranian response against Israel, underscoring the fragile nature of the diplomatic effort. Marion Messmer, director of the international security programme at Chatham House, highlighted a deeper strategic dilemma: the United States’ difficulty in managing its alliance with Israel amid the broader US‑Iran conflict. She noted that Israel’s insistence that its Lebanese operations are unrelated to the ceasefire reveals a “key vulnerability” in Washington’s ability to steer its regional partners, potentially trapping the US in a conflict it seeks to exit. Further complicating the picture, the Israeli Defense Forces reportedly assess that defeating Hezbollah remains unrealistic despite the intensified bombing campaign, suggesting that the current strategy may be more about political signaling than achieving decisive military objectives. In sum, the Israeli strike on Lebanon not only caused a tragic loss of civilian life but also raised serious questions about the durability of the US‑Iran ceasefire, the strategic calculations of Netanyahu’s government, and the broader stability of Middle‑East geopolitics.

President Donald Trump told Fox News host Trey Yingst that the United States had dispatched a substantial cache of firearms to Iranian protesters, routing them through Kurdish groups. He said, “We sent them a lot of guns. We sent them to the Kurds,” and added that the Kurds likely kept the weapons. This admission lends weight to Tehran’s long‑standing narrative that the December‑January demonstrations were not spontaneous but were driven by “foreign‑backed terrorists.” Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has repeatedly blamed the United States and Israel for hijacking the economic unrest that began on December 28, when Tehran shopkeepers protested the plunging rial. The protests quickly spread nationwide, drawing hundreds of thousands onto the streets. Rights groups and the United Nations report that at least 5,000 people were killed, with some estimates suggesting the death toll could rise to 20,000. The crackdown also saw thousands arrested and an internet blackout imposed to conceal the violence. As the US‑Israel war on Iran entered its 38th day, official tallies record 2,076 deaths and over 26,000 injuries across the country. Despite Trump’s statements, several Kurdish opposition groups have categorically denied receiving any U.S. weapons. A senior official of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) told Iraqi broadcaster Rudaw that the claims were “baseless,” noting that their armaments are decades‑old and sourced locally. The Komala Party issued a similar denial. Analysts caution that Trump’s remarks are difficult to verify. Neil Quilliam of the United Kingdom’s Chatham House said the comments “reveal nothing material” and may reflect Trump’s personal rhetoric more than concrete policy. Nonetheless, such statements could undermine the cohesion of Iranian opposition groups and influence international perceptions of the conflict. In the broader geopolitical context, the United States has framed its February 28 strikes—carried out jointly with Israel—as a response to Iran’s nuclear program and as a means to “free” Iranians from the Islamic Republic’s repression. Trump linked the military action directly to the protests, claiming Tehran had “killed tens of thousands of its own citizens on the street as they protested.” While Kurdish factions continue to advocate for peaceful, civil protest methods, the U.S. and Israeli governments have not yet committed to ground operations in Iran. Opposition Democrats in the U.S. Congress remain skeptical of any escalation involving troops. Overall, Trump’s confirmation of arms shipments adds a new layer to the already complex narrative surrounding the Iranian protests, the US‑Israel military campaign, and the broader struggle for influence in the region.