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Burkina Faso's military leader, Ibrahim Traore, has made a striking statement, urging citizens to 'forget about democracy'. This declaration comes just three months after his government dissolved all political parties in the West African nation.In a lengthy interview on state television, Traore referenced Libya as an example where outsiders attempted to impose democracy but failed. He claimed that democracy 'kills' and equates it with slavery.Traore's government has been distancing itself from initial promises to restore democratic governance. He seized power in September 2022, following a military coup that overthrew the democratically elected government of President Roch Marc Kabore.The military government had promised to combat al-Qaeda and ISIL-linked armed groups but the country continues to face repeated attacks, with hundreds of thousands of civilians displaced.Traore initially promised elections in 2024 but later reneged, stating they would only be held when all parts of Burkina Faso are safe for voting.In January, Traore's government scrapped over 100 political parties and seized their assets. Parliament and political activity were previously suspended, and the Independent National Electoral Commission was dissolved in July 2025.Analysts have raised concerns about the government's targeting of institutions, including the media and judiciary. Journalists, political opposition leaders, and prosecutors critical of the military government have been forcibly conscripted and sent to the front lines.Burkina Faso, along with neighboring military governments in Niger and Mali, exited the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) bloc to form their own Alliance of Sahel States (AES) last January.The country has turned to Russian paramilitary fighters after evicting former colonial power, France, which had deployed some 5,000 soldiers to help fight armed groups in the Sahel region.Violence in Burkina Faso has continued to escalate, with fatalities tripling in the three years since Traore took power, reaching 17,775 by last May. Most of those killed were civilians, many by government forces and allied militias.

The ongoing conflict between the US and Israel against Iran has significantly impacted global oil supplies, causing prices to surge. Despite this, US President Donald Trump claims that the US is 'totally independent' of the Middle East and doesn't need their oil. However, experts argue that the oil market is highly interconnected, making it unlikely that the US can escape the effects of the crisis.The US is a major oil producer, having surpassed other countries due to the fracking boom. Yet, it still imports millions of barrels per day, with a significant portion coming from Gulf nations. This reliance on imports means that the US is not as insulated from global price trends as Trump suggests.Oil prices have risen by nearly half since the start of the war, with Brent crude trading above $100 per barrel. This increase has had a ripple effect on the global economy, with US fuel prices breaching $4 per gallon for the first time since 2022. The surge in fuel costs is likely to impact the US economy and may influence the midterm elections.Experts warn that the concept of 'energy independence' may be a 'smokescreen' and that low-income households will be disproportionately affected by higher fuel prices. While some sectors of the US economy, such as energy production, may benefit from the current situation, the overall impact on consumers is expected to be negative.The article also highlights the broader implications of the conflict, including disruptions to global fertilizer supplies and helium production. With the Strait of Hormuz remaining paralyzed, the effects of the crisis are likely to be prolonged, and experts are skeptical that fuel prices will quickly return to normal even if the conflict ends soon.

Iraq is facing a balancing act as the US-Israeli war on Iran exposes deep divisions within the country. The conflict has highlighted the divisions between those who view the attacks on Iran as a means to end Tehran's longstanding influence over Iraqi politics and those who are loyal to the Islamic republic. The war has struck Iraq during a precarious power vacuum, following the stepping aside of caretaker leader Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, whose coalition won the largest share of seats in November's parliamentary elections. This power vacuum has exacerbated tensions, with factions from the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella body of Iran-backed armed groups, vowing to drag the US into a long war of attrition. The group has claimed responsibility for numerous drone and missile attacks on targets in Iraq and neighboring countries, including the US base in Erbil and the city's international airport. In response, unclaimed airstrikes attributed to US and Israeli forces have hit positions across the country, killing several commanders and fighters. Iraqi leaders are attempting to maintain a balancing act, denouncing the killing of Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei while rejecting attempts by Tehran to draw Iraq into the conflict. However, this balancing act is complicated by the fact that pro-Iran groups are also members of the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU), a sprawling institution that operates with its own agenda. The conflict has significant implications for Iraq's stability and economy, with a looming financial disaster hanging over the country due to the crisis over the strait of Hormuz and the loss of oil revenue. The US pressure and threat of sanctions have forced some members of the pro-Iran Shia alliance in Iraq's parliament to distance themselves from more militant factions. The killing of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, has also had a profound impact on the Iraqi resistance factions, which have struggled to respond effectively to the recent war. The insider close to the pro-Iran factions noted that the killing of Nasrallah has affected the Iraqi resistance factions more than the killing of Khamenei, as Nasrallah had a direct appeal to many commanders.

Britain is confronting the most severe energy shock since the early 1970s, as exports of oil, gas and fertiliser from the Middle East have abruptly stopped. The government says a response plan exists, but details remain vague. It is unclear whether the UK is better prepared for the fallout from Donald Trump’s war with Iran than it was for the pandemic six years ago. Ministers are sending a "we have your back" message to the public while simultaneously signalling to financial markets that any assistance will be limited and targeted. Contingency planning is especially difficult when dealing with an unpredictable leader like Trump. Britain’s heavy reliance on imported energy and food means that reassurance can only hold for a short time. The economy entered the conflict already on shaky ground: unemployment rose steadily throughout 2025 and growth stalled to a virtual standstill in the final quarter of that year. The sudden loss of Middle‑East energy and fertiliser supplies now adds a colossal supply shock. Last year, Trump’s “liberation day” tariff hikes served as a dry run for a far more serious confrontation. This time, the war is taking place in a region that is both volatile and crucial to the global economy. In the past two weeks, the repercussions have been felt across Asia – the Philippines declared a state of emergency, Sri Lanka introduced a four‑day work week, and South Korea announced budget measures to help households cope with soaring energy bills. The continent is the most dependent on Gulf‑exported energy, making the impact there the sharpest. The International Monetary Fund warned that the shock will drive higher prices and slower growth worldwide. Shortages push fuel and food prices up, eroding disposable income, prompting businesses to cut staff, and increasing the risk of recession. The UK, already projected to be one of the poorest‑performing major economies in 2026, could see its fresh graduate cohort face a brutal job market. Trump’s claim that the war could end within two or three weeks appears desperate. Even a rapid cease‑fire would leave substantial collateral damage, creating a stagflation scenario that could hurt Republican prospects in the upcoming mid‑term elections. British officials hope a swift resolution will limit economic damage, allowing a short‑term inflation spike to subside and the Bank of England to resume interest‑rate cuts. Treasury plans include scrapping the planned autumn fuel‑duty rise and providing targeted help for the poorest households, though the path is unlikely to be that simple. Currently, the Treasury is hesitant to act boldly for fear of unsettling bond markets. History – the 2008 banking collapse and the 2020 pandemic – shows that governments can act decisively without triggering a market backlash, using tools such as aggressive rate cuts, increased borrowing, and quantitative easing. The Bank of England has warned of a "substantial negative supply shock" and is expected to soften markets for future rate cuts, which are inevitable. Finance Minister Rachel Reeves could mitigate labour‑market pain by reversing recent increases in employers’ National Insurance contributions, subsidising public transport, and even lowering speed limits to conserve energy. The war, like the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, underscores the fragility of global supply chains and the need for greater British self‑reliance. Investing heavily in renewable energy is essential, but the UK also imports roughly 40% of its food and has not run a manufacturing trade surplus since 1982. In a world of disrupted supply lines, a robust plan for economic self‑sufficiency is more urgent than ever. Larry Elliott is a Guardian columnist.

The UK is bracing for a potential third inflationary shock in less than a decade as the conflict between Iran and the US threatens to disrupt oil supplies. The Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway for global oil supplies, is at risk of being blocked, which could lead to a significant increase in oil prices. The impact of such a disruption would be felt globally, with Asia being particularly affected as it buys 80% of the oil transported through the strait. Countries in the region are already experiencing the effects, with governments imposing limits on driving and shortening working weeks to conserve energy. Populations are struggling with dramatic hikes in food prices and shortages of petrol and diesel. In Bangladesh, the government reportedly believes it will run out of oil and gas within weeks. To conserve fuel, some temples in Thailand have stopped cremations. The energy-supply storm may well hit the UK's shores just before next month's elections, prompting Keir Starmer to call Cobra meetings and Rachel Reeves to summon business leaders into Downing Street. The poorest households will be hit hardest by the inflationary shock, with food producers predicting prices will rocket nearly 10% this year. According to calculations done exclusively for this column by the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU), that will add £127 to the average household's annual food bill. However, the ECIU also notes that because the poorest spend proportionately more of their money on food, they will be hit far worse. The author suggests that the UK needs to adopt a more progressive approach to utility pricing, with a move away from fossil fuels and from the current system of ownership. The days of relying on a growth miracle are over, and the UK needs to focus on addressing the inequality and regressive utility pricing that will exacerbate the impact of the inflationary shock.

Cricket Australia released its 21‑man contract roster for the 2026‑27 season, rewarding most Ashes‑winning players but leaving out Sam Konstas and veteran all‑rounder Glenn Maxwell as the board prepares for an unusually dense calendar. Fast‑bowler Brendan Doggett, who debuted in the opening Ashes Test at Perth last November, secured his first national contract. Meanwhile, opener Jake Weatherald retained an upgraded deal despite a modest series average of 22.33 runs. Both Michael Neser and spinner Todd Murphy were again awarded full contracts, reflecting the board’s focus on depth ahead of a schedule that kicks off with a two‑match home Test series against Bangladesh in August. Following the Bangladesh series, Australia will embark on ODI tours of Zimbabwe and South Africa, a home white‑ball series versus England, and a marathon stretch of 10 Test matches in 14 weeks. The latter includes contests against New Zealand, India and the historic 150th Anniversary Test at the MCG. Konstas, who burst onto the scene with a memorable 60‑run debut against India on Boxing Day 2024, failed to build on that promise, accumulating only 103 runs across nine further Test innings for an average of 16.30. The lack of consistency cost him a place on the new list. Despite the setback, selector chair George Bailey stressed that the 20‑year‑old’s journey is far from over. “He is highly talented and still on a development path,” Bailey said. “We saw encouraging signs toward the end of the season, with more consistent starts in the Sheffield Shield.” Bailey added that Konstas could feature in the upcoming Australia A tour to India, noting the board’s continued interest in his progress. Alongside Konstas and Maxwell, the contract cuts also affected Lance Morris, Jhye Richardson and Matt Short. Long‑time opener Usman Khawaja remains absent following his retirement. Weatherald’s contract renewal signals the selectors’ confidence in his potential to open the batting against Bangladesh, although Bailey cautioned that final selections will be made closer to each series, with extensive camp periods in Brisbane to fine‑tune the squad. Current contracted players: Xavier Bartlett, Scott Boland, Alex Carey, Pat Cummins, Brendan Doggett, Nathan Ellis, Cameron Green, Josh Hazlewood, Travis Head, Josh Inglis, Matthew Kuhnemann, Marnus Labuschagne, Nathan Lyon, Mitchell Marsh, Todd Murphy, Michael Neser, Steve Smith, Mitchell Starc, Jake Weatherald, Beau Webster, Adam Zampa.

Somalia's national army has taken control of the strategic city of Baidoa, the largest in Southwest state, prompting the regional leader to resign. The city's takeover comes two weeks after the Southwest state administration announced it was severing ties with the federal government.The city of Baidoa, located about 245 km northwest of the capital Mogadishu, is home to international peacekeepers and humanitarian agencies in an area affected by drought, conflict, and displacement.Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen, the President of Southwest State, announced his resignation on Facebook, stating that he had been in office for more than seven years. His resignation comes days after he was re-elected for another five-year term, an election the federal government deemed illegal.Earlier on Monday, Somalia's federal forces entered Baidoa, taking full control of the city and marking the start of a political transition. A local elder described the city as calm but a ghost town.The Southwest state's transition began with the appointment of its finance minister, Ahmed Mohamed Hussein, as acting president through a formal decree. The central government in Mogadishu hailed the state's transition and urged calm and unity.The federal government emphasized that no acts of retaliation will be tolerated, underscoring its commitment to protecting lives and property during this sensitive political transition.The dispute with Southwest is the latest sign of strain in Somalia's fragile federal system, where disputes over elections and the balance of power between Mogadishu and regional administrations repeatedly open up political fault lines.

On a surprisingly quiet evening at Wembley, England’s 1-0 defeat to Japan unfolded in a half‑hour that was more ceremonial than competitive. The opening thirty minutes were fluffy and formless, offering little in the way of decisive play but plenty of clues about the team’s underlying issues.For manager Thomas Tuchel, the concession of the opening goal will likely linger in post‑match analysis sessions. The loss adds another chapter to what critics describe as the “never‑ending story of England footballdom,” where each friendly serves as a diagnostic test rather than a showcase of progress.Injuries and omissions forced Tuchel to field a makeshift side featuring Phil Foden, Morgan Rogers, Cole Palmer and Kobbie Mainoo. The line‑up lacked traditional power runners and aerial threats, resembling a “false nine” formation that felt experimental but ultimately failed to generate a clear tactical identity.Japan’s solitary goal came after Palmer lost possession in an attacking area, leaving a void that England’s midfield could not fill. The Japanese attack exploited the space, threading a pass through the centre of England’s formation and scoring with ease. The goal underscored England’s lack of pressure and positional awareness in the defensive third.Despite the disappointment, the match offered a glimpse of individual talent. Harry Maguire and Dan Burn were deployed on set‑pieces, and Jude Bellingham remained an unused asset, highlighting the depth of options available for the upcoming World Cup.Atmospherically, the match resembled a village fête more than a high‑stakes international fixture. Pre‑match entertainment featured a medley of music, fireworks and quirky performances, creating a backdrop that contrasted sharply with the on‑field performance.Analysts noted that England’s approach felt like an attempt to dress up “borrowed tactical clothes” rather than a coherent game plan. The lack of a defined structure left the side vulnerable to Japan’s disciplined, technically sound play.Looking ahead, Tuchel now faces the task of reconciling his experimental selections with the need for a pragmatic, battle‑ready squad. The friendly serves as a reminder that, while England possesses individual brilliance, the team must resolve its tactical ambiguities if it hopes to contend seriously for the 2026 World Cup.

The United States and Israel have launched a war against Iran that many observers label a monumental breach of international law, echoing the illegal aggression that began with Israel’s campaign in Gaza.According to recent reports, the Pentagon is ready to commit thousands of ground troops to the region, signaling a potential escalation that could last for weeks.Analysts warn that the conflict is poorly planned, especially given Iran’s capacity to disrupt shipping through the strategic Strait of Hormuz. The resulting choke‑choke on energy and essential commodities is already pushing the global economy toward a precarious edge, with Asian and African nations bearing the brunt of the fallout.History offers a stark warning. In 2003, the United States invaded Iraq on the premise of a swift campaign, a promise later proved hollow. The war extended for nearly nine years, costing $1.92 trillion in U.S. taxpayer money, claiming over 4,500 American lives, and contributing to more than half a million Iraqi deaths by 2006.Back then, the coalition assembled roughly 250,000 troops—including 150,000 from the United States and 46,000 from the United Kingdom—to invade a country far smaller than Iran. Today, the U.S. maintains about 50,000 troops in the Middle East, a modest increase of 10,000 over its usual presence, yet the objectives being discussed—occupying Iranian territory, seizing uranium stockpiles, and controlling key islands—appear overly ambitious.Israel’s role is also intensifying. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced an expansion of Israel’s security buffer in southern Lebanon, a region Israel occupied from 1982 to 2000. Since the 2024 cease‑fire with Hezbollah, Israel has reportedly violated the agreement around 10,000 times in its first year, suggesting that a weakened Iran could serve as a strategic boon for Israeli ambitions in Lebanon.For the United States, the war risks becoming a “Venezuela‑style” takeover that is far more complex than anticipated. As the conflict drags on and the prospect of U.S. ground combat looms, public support—already low—could erode further, potentially jeopardizing the political standing of President Trump ahead of the mid‑term elections.Critics argue that repeating the Iraq‑war playbook may not only fail to achieve its stated goals but could also hand strategic advantage to rival powers such as Russia or China, reshaping the balance of power in the Middle East.