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While the two‑week pause in the US‑Israel campaign against Iran remains uncertain, one constant is clear: Donald Trump lacks a concrete plan, but Benjamin Netanyahu does. The war’s stated aim – to cripple Iran’s state capacity – is only a stepping stone toward a larger vision of a Greater Israel. For Israel’s right‑wing, the phrase often evokes a purely territorial ambition: enlarging the land Israel claims. History shows this expansionist drive has repeatedly displaced Palestinians, a process that has accelerated dramatically in recent years. Since the war began, Israel has flattened Gaza, killing tens of thousands and reducing the civilian‑inhabitable area to roughly 12 % of its pre‑war size. In the West Bank, a wave of settlement expansion and property destruction rivals the scale of the 1967 conflict. Beyond the occupied territories, Israel has seized parts of Syria and is forging a de‑facto occupation zone in southern Lebanon, with ministers from Religious Zionism, Jewish Power and Likud openly demanding Israeli sovereignty there. Finance minister Bezalel Smotrich even called for an expansion “to Damascus,” and Netanyahu has publicly expressed a deep personal connection to this territorial vision. However, Greater Israel is as much a geopolitical and strategic construct as a land‑grab. Netanyahu’s ambition extends beyond occupying borders; he seeks a regional dominion built on new alliances and hard‑power dependencies. After the October 7 attacks and the ensuing Gaza devastation, Israel’s prospects for Arab‑state normalization stalled. Faced with a choice between a conciliatory approach and a zero‑sum rejection of a Palestinian future, Netanyahu chose the latter, aiming to eliminate Iran as a regional counterweight – a move that inevitably required massive US military involvement. Former Israeli security analysts note that, from the perspective of Sunni Gulf states, a weakened Iran would elevate Israel to the role of “dominant regional power.” Achieving this, according to the article, also means softening the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE) and making them dependent on Israel for security and energy routes. The spill‑over of Iranian drone and missile attacks on GCC infrastructure is portrayed not as an accident but as a calculated element of Israel’s strategy. When the US‑Israel coalition struck Iranian energy sites, Iran retaliated against the Gulf, disrupting global oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz. Netanyahu seized the moment to propose “alternative routes” – oil and gas pipelines that would bypass Hormuz and Bab‑al‑Mandab, ending at Israeli Mediterranean ports. In a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Netanyahu outlined a “hexagon of alliances” linking India, Arab nations, African states, Greece, Cyprus and other Asian partners, positioning Israel as the central hub. Recent IDF strategy papers echo this, suggesting Israel could achieve “operational control” far beyond its borders without permanent occupation, likening the Middle East to a “jungle” where Israel would become the “queen.” Netanyahu now describes Israel not merely as a “regional superpower” but, in some contexts, as a “global superpower.” He promises the hexagonal alliance will confront a “radical Shia axis” and an “emerging radical Sunni axis,” with Turkey singled out as the next strategic threat. Dismissal of the Greater Israel rhetoric as wartime hyperbole would be misleading. The article warns that a permanent war‑oriented mindset permeates Israel’s political elite, security establishment and media, posing a risk of overreach and regional blowback. Containing this expansive vision may become one of the most pressing post‑war challenges for the Middle East.

Intense rainfall has caused severe flooding in multiple provinces of Saudi Arabia, leading officials to temporarily close schools to ensure student safety. Video footage circulating online captures inundated streets, submerged vehicles, and classrooms rendered unusable by rising waters.Education authorities cited the need to protect children from hazardous conditions, noting that the closures affect thousands of students and may disrupt the academic calendar. The Ministry of Education is coordinating with local municipalities to assess damage and plan for a swift reopening once floodwaters recede.While the immediate priority remains public safety, the event underscores the growing vulnerability of infrastructure to extreme weather events in the region, prompting calls for improved flood‑risk management and resilient school facilities.

Saudi Arabia has returned its East‑West oil pipeline to full operational capacity, enabling the transport of approximately 7 million barrels of crude per day after a series of attacks disrupted flow earlier this week. In a statement released on Sunday, the Ministry of Energy praised the swift repair work, noting that the turnaround demonstrates the high operational resilience and crisis‑management efficiency of Saudi Aramco and the broader national energy system. The ministry also confirmed that production at the Manifa oilfield—situated off Saudi Arabia’s eastern coast—has been restored to its full capacity of about 300,000 barrels per day (bpd). Efforts continue at the inland Khurais oilfield, which is still recovering from a loss of roughly 300,000 bpd. Earlier reports from the Saudi Press Agency indicated that attacks on a pumping station along the East‑West pipeline had cut daily output by 700,000 bpd. Simultaneous assaults on the Manifa and Khurais fields were said to have reduced combined capacity by 600,000 bpd. No party was identified as responsible for the attacks. The East‑West pipeline, linking the prolific Abqaiq field in the east to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, has become a vital conduit for international oil supplies, especially as Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has choked off about 20% of global oil shipments, driving up energy prices worldwide. Despite a fragile cease‑fire announced on Tuesday between the United States and Iran, maritime traffic through the strait remains severely limited. Data from S&P; Global show that only 22 vessels with active AIS transponders passed through the strait between Wednesday and Friday, a stark drop from the pre‑conflict average of 135 daily transits. Restoring the pipeline’s full capacity is expected to reinforce supply continuity for both domestic and international markets, providing a modest but meaningful cushion to the global economy as geopolitical tensions persist.

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that the destroyers USS Frank E. Peterson and USS Michael Murphy "transited the Strait of Hormuz and operated in the Arabian Gulf" as part of a mission to clear sea mines allegedly laid by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).Admiral Brad Cooper hailed the operation as a turning point in the U.S.–Israeli campaign against Iran, saying the navy was establishing a "new passage" to restore safe commercial flow. Iran’s Khatam al‑Anbiya Central Headquarters immediately rejected the claim, stating that any vessel movement in the strait remains under the "Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran" and that the U.S. report is "strongly denied." The strait, a narrow chokepoint through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil and natural gas transits, has been a flashpoint since the February 28 U.S.–Israel attacks that prompted Iran to restrict passage to pre‑approved ships. The closure spiked global fuel prices and disrupted both commercial and military traffic. Analysts, such as Maria Sultan of the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, argue that any U.S. navigation would require Tehran’s explicit permission, underscoring the strategic leverage Iran holds over the waterway. Simultaneously, senior delegations from the United States and Iran met in Islamabad for historic face‑to‑face talks—the highest‑level engagement since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The negotiations, sparked by a preliminary ceasefire announced earlier in the week, focus on contentious issues including Iran’s nuclear program, frozen assets, and the future of Israeli operations in Lebanon. Both parties acknowledge that control of the Strait of Hormuz remains a major point of disagreement. Iran has signaled willingness to temporarily reopen the channel for commercial shipping but insists on maintaining leverage, proposing tolls to compensate for war damages. The United States, however, deems continued Iranian control a "non‑starter." U.S. President Donald Trump used his Truth Social platform to assert that Iran is "losing big" and to downplay the strait’s importance to the United States relative to its allies, claiming the mine‑clearing effort benefits nations such as China, Japan, South Korea, France, and Germany. Al Jazeera’s on‑the‑ground correspondents noted that despite a "deficit of trust," negotiators are working late into the night to bridge gaps, though fundamental disagreements over the strait’s governance persist.

Pakistan dispatched a mixed fleet of fighter and support aircraft to King Abdulaziz Air Base in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province on Saturday, marking the first visible military action under the mutual defence agreement signed in September 2025. The Saudi Ministry of Defence confirmed the landing, noting the deployment aligns with the collective defence clause that obliges each signatory to treat an attack on the other as an attack on itself. At the same time, Islamabad is hosting direct US‑Iran negotiations aimed at halting weeks of regional fighting triggered by Iran’s missile and drone strikes on Gulf targets after the US‑Israeli killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on 28 February. Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar told reporters he personally warned Iranian leaders in early March that Pakistan must honour its obligations to Riyadh. Tehran, seeking assurances that Saudi soil would not be used for attacks against it, received such guarantees, Dar added. Despite these diplomatic overtures, Iranian attacks on Saudi facilities – including key bases and a US embassy building – have persisted. In early March, Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, flew to Riyadh to discuss measures to curb Iranian strikes within the framework of the defence pact. Four days before the jet deployment, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif phoned Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, pledging that Pakistan would stand “shoulder to shoulder” with Saudi Arabia. The two leaders also agreed to accelerate a $5 billion Saudi investment package earmarked for Pakistan. Saudi Finance Minister Mohammed al‑Jadaan met Sharif, Dar and Munir in Islamabad on Saturday, underscoring the economic dimension of the partnership. Saudi Arabia hosts roughly 2.5 million Pakistani workers, whose remittances are vital to Pakistan’s fragile economy, and has repeatedly provided financial assistance. Security analyst Imtiaz Gul told Al Jazeera the deployment was not intended as a military escalation but as a “messaging tool” to remind Tehran of Pakistan’s treaty obligations. “Three jets won’t make much of a difference militarily,” he said, noting Saudi Arabia’s own sizable air force. Michael Kugelman, senior fellow for South Asia at the Atlantic Council, described the move as “a risky gambit.” He warned that if Iran refuses concessions, Pakistan could be drawn closer to Saudi Arabia, potentially invoking the defence pact in a renewed conflict.

Pakistan is set to host high-level talks between the United States and Iran in Islamabad, with a modest goal of getting the two nations to find common ground to continue negotiations. The talks, which will be held in a 'proximity format' with Pakistani officials shuttling messages between the two teams, follow a Pakistan-mediated two-week ceasefire agreed upon by the US and Iran.The US delegation, led by Vice President JD Vance, and the Iranian team, expected to be led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, will meet at the Serena Hotel in Islamabad. Despite the significant differences between the two nations, experts and sources close to the mediation effort have expressed little expectation of a major breakthrough.Pakistan's goal is to secure an agreement for the US and Iran to continue dialogue, with the aim of building on the truce that led to a collective sigh of relief globally. The talks will focus on finding a lasting peace deal, with key issues including verifiable restrictions on Iran's nuclear programme and full sanctions relief.The talks are taking place against a backdrop of escalating tensions in Lebanon, with Iran framing Israeli strikes on Lebanon as a direct challenge to the ceasefire. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian warned that continued attacks would render negotiations meaningless.Despite these challenges, there are tentative signs of easing tensions ahead of the talks, with US Vice President JD Vance expressing optimism about the negotiations and Saudi Arabia's foreign minister speaking with his Iranian counterpart for the first time since the war started.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has confirmed that his country's technology played a crucial role in shooting down Iranian drones in the Middle East. This development comes after Zelenskyy announced last month that expert teams had been deployed to the region following the outbreak of the United States-Israeli war on Iran.In a recent statement, Zelenskyy revealed that Ukrainian forces participated in operations using domestically produced interceptor drones against 'Shahed' drones, which are similar to those used by Russia during its ongoing conflict with Ukraine.Key highlights of Zelenskyy's statement include:Ukrainian forces successfully destroyed Iranian 'shaheds' in several countries.The operations were not limited to training missions but involved actual support in building modern air defence systems.Ukrainian experts provided crucial advice on strengthening air defence systems in countries that collaborated with them.Zelenskyy expressed optimism about the future, stating that it is only a matter of time before mass production of interceptors capable of destroying drones with jet engines commences.Kyiv has effectively utilized cheap drone interceptors to neutralize Russian drones before they reach their targets. As part of the agreement, Ukraine is receiving weapons to protect its energy infrastructure and, in some cases, financial arrangements.During his recent visits to Gulf nations, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates, Zelenskyy signed defence agreements with the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.

Amid escalating tensions in the Middle East, the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) has postponed the draw for the 2027 men’s Asian Cup, originally scheduled for Riyadh, and is exploring contingency plans. Australia has been urged to submit an emergency hosting bid to ensure the tournament proceeds as planned.The competition, set to kick off on 7 January 2027 and run for four weeks, will feature 24 national teams, including the Socceroos, across venues in Riyadh, Jeddah and Khobar. With the draw delayed and the Saudi venue’s security under question, AFC officials are weighing alternative locations.Former Australian international Craig Foster argues that the nation is uniquely positioned to step in on short notice. He highlights the success of the 2015 men’s Asian Cup and the recent Women’s Asian Cup hosted in Australia, noting that the country demonstrated both logistical capability and fan engagement.“Hosting the tournament would be a vital diplomatic gesture at a time when Australia’s reputation in the Middle East has suffered,” Foster said, adding that the event could deliver a significant economic uplift for the hospitality industry as teams and supporters flock to Australian cities.Data from the 2015 edition show that 15,000 overseas visitors generated more than half of the tournament’s $81 million direct spend. By contrast, the federal and state contributions to the women’s Asian Cup exceeded $20 million, underscoring the financial stakes involved.The Australian government has indicated willingness to collaborate with Football Australia, stating that any investment in international sport would be considered through regular budget processes. Foster has called on sport minister Anika Wells to endorse an emergency hosting proposal.Football Australia emphasizes that AFC tournaments have become “some of the most significant events in the global football calendar,” delivering “substantial economic, diplomatic, social, and health value for Australia.” Continued support from all government levels, they argue, is essential to maintain the country’s status as a premier host nation.Saudi Arabia, which secured hosting rights in 2023 and will later stage the 2034 FIFA World Cup, now faces uncertainty as its venues sit within striking distance of ongoing regional hostilities, including recent Iranian counter‑attacks near the under‑construction Aramco Stadium in Khobar.

The Gulf Cooperation Council is reassessing its security model after the brief but intense US‑Israel campaign against Iran. With American bases on Gulf soil turning the region into a target for Tehran’s missile and drone barrage, Gulf capitals are looking to diversify their defence partners beyond the United States. Iran’s lingering missile arsenal and its demand to retain control of the Strait of Hormuz remain the central security dilemma. The strait channels the bulk of Gulf oil trade, and Tehran’s insistence on keeping a foothold there was a sticking point in the cease‑fire talks scheduled to begin in Islamabad. Gulf air defences boasted a high interception rate, claiming to have neutralised more than 90% of the 2,256 drones and 563 missiles that struck the United Arab Emirates, the hardest‑hit member of the bloc. Nevertheless, the Gulf is split on how to engage Iran moving forward. A hawkish bloc led by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain favours a tougher stance, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar and others are open to restoring diplomatic ties. In a rare development, Saudi Arabia and Iran held their first official conversation since the conflict began, with foreign ministers discussing measures to lower tensions and restore regional stability. Security scholars such as Bader Mousa Al‑Saif of Kuwait University argue that Gulf states must broaden their security network, forging alliances with regional powers like Turkey and Pakistan rather than relying solely on the United States. He warned that the region needs a model that shields it from a perpetual state of war. Pre‑war trends are now accelerating: Saudi Arabia recently signed a defence pact with Pakistan, the UAE announced a partnership with India, and all three Gulf states – Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar – entered rapid defence agreements with Ukraine to counter Iranian drone threats. Talks of a “Muslim NATO” have largely faded, but a new alignment dubbed “Step”, involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan, is taking shape. The coalition’s purpose remains ambiguous, oscillating between counter‑Iran and counter‑Israel objectives, and internal rivalries complicate cohesion. The United Kingdom, which helped protect Gulf airspace during the hostilities, is also seeking deeper defence‑industrial cooperation with Saudi Arabia, as discussed by Prime Minister Keir Starmer in Jeddah. UAE political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla predicts tighter security ties with the United States and a growing willingness among Gulf states to engage with Israel on military and intelligence fronts. Analysts such as Yasmine Farouk of the International Crisis Group note that Saudi Arabia’s extensive oil infrastructure, Red Sea ports and sheer geographic size give it a strategic advantage in post‑war reconstruction, though the cost of rebuilding could strain its Vision 2030 diversification agenda. Looking ahead, the Gulf is expected to layer additional security partnerships—particularly with European nations—while investing heavily in air and missile defence, hardened ports, desalination facilities, maritime surveillance and alternative export routes. As Andreas Krieg of King’s College London observes, the United States remains the only power with a full‑scale military architecture in the Gulf, but its bases are increasingly viewed as “tripwires” rather than protective shields.