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The strategic Strait of Hormuz, linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, has become the focal point of the Israel‑U.S. war on Iran that began in February. In peacetime the narrow waterway handled about 20% of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments without any tolls, but the conflict has turned it into a contested zone. After a series of Israeli and U.S. strikes, Iran retaliated by targeting merchant vessels it deemed hostile, effectively shutting the passage and triggering one of the most severe energy‑distribution crises in recent memory. While a two‑week ceasefire, brokered by Pakistan, was declared on Tuesday, Tehran has issued a set of official terms that would govern the strait moving forward. According to Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghi, safe passage will be allowed in coordination with the Iranian armed forces and subject to technical limitations. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has even published a new navigation map that pushes traffic farther north, away from the traditional route near Oman’s coast, citing the risk of anti‑ship mines. Central to Tehran’s 10‑point peace proposal is the idea of charging fees for strait usage. Iranian media report that the plan could levy up to $2 million per vessel—a sum to be shared with Oman—or a charge of $1 per barrel of oil shipped. The revenue would allegedly fund reconstruction of military and civilian infrastructure damaged by the U.S.–Israeli campaign. Oman has publicly rejected any toll scheme, with Transport Minister Said Al‑Maawali reminding that the country has already signed all relevant international maritime transport agreements that prohibit such fees. International law adds another layer of complexity. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) prohibits levying charges for mere passage through international straits, allowing fees only for services like navigation assistance or port use. Neither the United States nor Iran have ratified UNCLOS, but the principle remains a benchmark for maritime norms. Analysts suggest a possible workaround: charging for de‑mining and safety services rather than for passage itself, which could be permissible under existing legal frameworks. The proposal has sparked diplomatic pushback. At the United Nations Security Council, Bahrain led a resolution urging coordinated reopening of the strait, backed by Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan. The resolution passed with 11 of 15 votes, but was vetoed by Russia and China, who argued it unfairly targeted Iran and ignored the initial strikes. Beyond the region, the United States is unlikely to accept indefinite tolls. Former President Donald Trump, who announced the ceasefire, warned that U.S. forces would remain in the area and threatened to resume attacks if negotiations faltered. American troops are reportedly “hanging around” to assist with traffic buildup, though the extent of their operational control remains unclear. Maritime analyst C. Uday Bhaskar notes that only three to five ships have traversed the strait since the ceasefire began, underscoring the lingering uncertainty for global shippers. He adds that ship owners facing multi‑million‑dollar losses each day may ultimately acquiesce to Iran’s terms, at least temporarily. Should Iran implement a toll regime, the immediate impact would fall on Gulf oil‑producing nations, but the ripple effects could destabilize global energy markets, already strained by supply shocks. Major powers such as the United Kingdom have been coordinating with a coalition of 40 countries to explore alternative mechanisms for reopening the waterway without conceding to tolls. In sum, Iran’s proposed protocol for the Strait of Hormuz introduces a contentious new variable into an already volatile geopolitical landscape, pitting national security interests against established maritime law and the broader stability of world energy supplies.

In a stark assessment of the ongoing regional confrontation, Iranian officials acknowledge that the country has endured significant casualties, yet they assert that Tehran is gaining a strategic advantage over the combined forces of the United States and Israel. The narrative, presented by Al Jazeera on April 9, 2026, emphasizes that despite being "bloodied," Iran perceives its actions as a victory against the US‑Israel axis. This framing signals Tehran’s intent to portray resilience and influence, even as the human and material costs rise. Analysts note that such rhetoric serves multiple purposes: it bolsters domestic morale, signals to regional allies that Iran remains a formidable player, and attempts to undermine the cohesion of the US‑Israel partnership. By positioning itself as a winner in a conflict where the costs are visible, Iran aims to reshape the discourse around its regional role. While the article does not provide specific casualty figures or detailed military outcomes, the emphasis on a perceived strategic win suggests a broader shift in Tehran’s diplomatic messaging. The statement may also foreshadow Iran’s next steps in leveraging its position to negotiate from a place of perceived strength. Observers will watch closely how this narrative influences both Tehran’s internal politics and its external engagements with neighboring states, as well as how the United States and Israel respond to a claim of Iranian ascendancy despite evident hardships.

Djibouti, a one‑million‑strong nation perched on the Bab al‑Mandeb Strait, is set to hold its presidential election on April 10. All signs point to incumbent Ismail Omar Guelleh securing a sixth term with little genuine opposition. The country’s strategic location—linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden—makes it a linchpin for global trade and a magnet for foreign military installations. The United States, France, China, Italy and Japan all maintain bases there, earning Djibouti the reputation of hosting the highest concentration of overseas military sites. Officially, Djibouti recognizes French and Arabic, while Somali and Afar are widely spoken among the two main ethnic groups, which together comprise roughly 95% of the population. Islam is practiced by about 94% of residents, and the Djiboutian franc remains the national currency. According to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 243,471 citizens—about a quarter of the population—are registered to vote, up from roughly 215,000 in the 2021 poll. Historical turnout averages around 67%. IGAD’s eight‑nation bloc has dispatched 17 observers from Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda to monitor the process, with a post‑vote statement slated for April 12. Ismail Omar Guelleh, 78, leads the ruling People’s Rally for Progress. After parliament lifted the 75‑year age ceiling in November and abolished term limits back in 2010, Guelleh is now eligible for another term. Critics label his rule as authoritarian, yet they also acknowledge the relative stability he has maintained in a volatile region. Guelleh’s administration has turned Djibouti’s lack of natural resources into a revenue engine by signing infrastructure deals with China and leasing military facilities to Western powers. In 2017, Finance Minister Ilyas Dawaleh estimated that the bases generate roughly $125 million annually, with the United States contributing nearly half of that sum. The U.S. installation, Camp Lemonnier, remains the only permanent American base on the continent. The sole challenger, Mohamed Farah Samatar, runs under the Unified Democratic Centre after breaking away from the ruling party. His campaign slogan—“another Djibouti is possible”—has resonated only modestly, and observers such as Horn‑of‑Africa expert Sonia le Gouriellec describe the contest as a “token competition”. Human‑rights advocates echo this sentiment, calling the election a “masquerade” and a foregone conclusion. Key issues dominate the discourse. Democratic freedoms have eroded; opposition parties have boycotted elections since 2016, and Guelleh captured over 90% of the vote in 2021. The country ranks 168th out of 180 in the 2025 Reporters Without Borders press‑freedom index, and allegations of corruption and nepotism persist, including speculation that Guelleh’s stepson, Naguib Abdallah Kamil, is being groomed for succession. Economically, Djibouti’s reliance on Chinese financing is creating fiscal strain. By 2026 the nation owed China roughly $1.2 billion in loans, prompting the IMF to label its debt profile “in distress and unsustainable”. Massive infrastructure projects—most notably a railway to Ethiopia—have failed to curb poverty, with 73% of the youth unemployed. The country’s lifeline is its port system, which handles virtually all of Ethiopia’s maritime trade, amounting to about $2 billion in annual revenue. Ethiopia’s recent flirtation with a Somaliland port deal threatened Djibouti’s monopoly, though a Turkey‑mediated agreement in late 2024 redirected Ethiopia toward a “reliable and sustainable” sea corridor with Somalia. In sum, the upcoming election is less about a competitive political showdown and more about reaffirming a status quo that intertwines Djibouti’s geopolitical leverage, foreign‑military income, and mounting debt challenges.

A Turkish diplomatic convoy issued a strong statement condemning what it described as “lawless aggression” by the United States and Israel. The condemnation underscores growing tensions in the region and reflects Ankara’s opposition to recent policies pursued by the two countries.In its remarks, the convoy emphasized that such actions undermine international law and threaten regional stability. While specific incidents were not detailed, the language used signals a heightened diplomatic rift between Turkey and its Western allies.The declaration arrives amid broader geopolitical strains, with Turkey increasingly vocal about perceived unilateral moves by the US and Israel. Analysts note that this rhetoric could influence future diplomatic engagements and affect cooperation on security and economic matters.

The Gulf region breathed a sigh of relief on Tuesday after Iran and the United States agreed to a two-week truce, halting over five weeks of escalating attacks and hostile rhetoric.However, Gulf states are expressing caution, concerned that the US, seeking a swift exit, might agree to terms granting Iran some control over the Strait of Hormuz, a vital waterway through which one fifth of the world's oil and natural liquefied gas passes.Iran had nearly brought traffic through the strait to a standstill in response to joint US-Israeli attacks on its soil since February 28. Under the truce, Iran has agreed to halt attacks for two weeks in exchange for resumed maritime transit in the key waterway.Despite this, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are stressing that any deal must result in a permanent, long-term arrangement to keep the strait open. They fear a weakened yet intact Iranian leadership could use the strait as leverage, leaving them under constant threat of disruption and economic blackmail.“There is a quiet but palpable concern that President Trump, eager for a quick political victory, could tolerate some Iranian leverage over the strait in exchange for a fragile truce, prioritising optics over Gulf realities,” said Hesham Alghannam, a Saudi Arabia-based scholar at the Malcolm H Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center.The GCC countries, which have faced near-daily Iranian missile and drone attacks, have welcomed the truce but emphasize that the Strait of Hormuz must reopen. They are also concerned about Iran's future influence over the strait, with a Bahrain-sponsored UN Security Council resolution calling for countries to use defensive missions to keep the maritime chokepoint open being vetoed by Russia and China.A further escalation could have devastating consequences for the GCC economies, undoing decades of work to make the region a safe hub for finance, tourism, and culture. Analysts say GCC countries have stepped up diplomacy in the lead-up to the conflict, but officials across the region have warned Iran should not mistake their inaction as a sign of weakness.“The Gulf will leave no stone unturned if Iran continues to take the path of aggression,” said Hamad Althunayyan, a political analyst and professor at Kuwait University. “The Gulf expects its interests to be represented, and included, in any deal with Iran.”

At a Wednesday briefing, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt framed the ongoing US‑Israel war against Iran as a "test" that NATO failed, hinting that President Donald Trump is weighing a possible withdrawal from the alliance. She quoted the president saying the partnership had turned its back on the American people over the past six weeks. Shortly thereafter, Trump met with NATO Secretary‑General Mark Rutte at the White House. Both described the discussion as "frank and open," with Rutte acknowledging logistical support and base access from allies, but noting the absence of direct military contributions. During a CNN interview, host Jake Tapper asked Rutte whether the president intended to pull the United States out of NATO or at least reduce its backing. Rutte admitted there was disappointment, yet emphasized he had listened carefully to Trump’s arguments and praised the president’s leadership. Since assuming office in 2025, Trump has intensified pressure on NATO members to raise defence spending. At the 2025 NATO summit, members agreed to a non‑binding target of 5 % of GDP by 2035. Spain’s request for an exemption sparked a year‑long public denouncement by Trump. Earlier, Trump threatened to seize the Danish territory of Greenland, claiming its strategic value, though the United States has since softened that stance. Nevertheless, he continues to argue that US control of Greenland is essential, despite opposition from local residents and European leaders. The Wall Street Journal reported that the administration is evaluating the closure of U.S. bases or the redeployment of troops from countries such as Spain and Germany as retaliation for their limited engagement in the Iran conflict. When pressed about a potential NATO exit, Leavitt confirmed that the president "has discussed" the option and may address it after his meeting with Rutte. The president’s relationship with Rutte remains close; the Dutch leader has visited the White House multiple times during Trump’s second term. Rutte warned that NATO "will not work" without U.S. support, underscoring the strategic stakes of any American pull‑back. The unfolding debate highlights a deepening rift between Washington and its European partners at a time when the broader geopolitical landscape is already destabilised by the Iran war.

US Vice President JD Vance labeled Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's comments about Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban as “completely scandalous” during a stop in Budapest. Vance’s remarks came as Hungary prepares for a critical parliamentary election on April 12, the toughest test of Orban’s 16‑year rule. Vance, speaking at a Hungarian university, said that a foreign head of government should never threaten the leader of an allied nation. He added that the media shows a double standard when it highlights alleged foreign interference in the 2016 U.S. election but downplays similar concerns in the Hungarian vote. Budapest has long accused Kyiv of attempting to influence the election by disrupting the flow of Russian oil through the Druzhba pipeline. Kyiv counters that the pipeline was damaged by a Russian drone attack in late January and is being repaired as quickly as possible. In retaliation, Hungary blocked a €90 billion (≈$105 billion) EU loan intended for Ukraine. Zelenskyy responded by warning that he could provide the identity of those responsible to the Ukrainian army, saying they could “speak with him in their own language.” Vance also criticized the European Union, arguing that withholding billions of euros from Hungary for “border protection” and Ukraine’s pipeline shutdown are not acts of foreign influence but rather political pressure. The European Commission said it would convey its concerns to Washington through diplomatic channels, highlighting the growing friction between the EU, the United States, and Hungary over the upcoming election. These developments illustrate how the Hungarian vote has become a flashpoint for broader geopolitical rivalries, linking domestic politics with U.S.‑EU coordination, Ukraine’s war‑time financing, and the future of EU‑Hungary relations.

The White House has reiterated that the United States continues to reject any uranium enrichment inside Iran, reaffirming that US President Donald Trump did not agree to a 'wish list' submitted by Tehran. The US stance on uranium enrichment remains a major point of contention in talks between the two countries.Trump's spokesperson, Karoline Leavitt, suggested that the 10-point proposal put forward by Iran as the basis for a ceasefire in the US-Israel war on Iran differs from the proposal published by the government in Tehran. The proposal included Iran's right to enrich uranium, which the US has rejected."The president's red lines, namely the end of Iranian enrichment in Iran, have not changed," Leavitt said. This stance has been a major sticking point in previous talks between Tehran and Washington.Domestic uranium enrichment has been a contentious issue, with Iran insisting on enriching its own uranium as a national right, while the Trump administration has pushed for dismantling the Iranian nuclear programme altogether. The US and Israel have claimed victory in the conflict, while Iran has also claimed success.After more than 38 days of war, Washington and Tehran announced a two-week ceasefire that will see the US stop its attacks and Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The first round of negotiations will take place in the Pakistani capital, Islamabad, on Saturday, led by US Vice President JD Vance, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, and Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner.However, Iran's Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf cast doubt over the fate of the talks, citing US and Israeli violations of the ceasefire. The talks' success remains uncertain amid these tensions.

US President Donald Trump has announced that countries supplying Iran with military weapons will face immediate 50% tariffs on all goods sold to the United States, with no exemptions. This move comes hours after Trump agreed to a two-week ceasefire with Tehran.In a social media post, Trump stated that 'A Country supplying Military Weapons to Iran will be immediately tariffed, on any and all goods sold to the United States of America, 50%, effective immediately. There will be no exclusions or exemptions!'However, experts have raised questions about the legal authority behind Trump's announcement, as the Supreme Court struck down his use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose broad global tariffs in February. The IEEPA has been used extensively for decades to back financial sanctions against Iran, Russia, and North Korea.Rachel Ziemba, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, told Al Jazeera that 'it's a lot more complicated to do that after IEEPA was struck down. There's no immediate policy lever and authorisation that is available for the US to do that. So they need either an act of Congress or need to adapt some other trade tool.'Trump did not specify which countries could face punitive tariffs, but China and Russia have helped Iran build military capacity to counter US and Israeli pressure. The US imports from Russia have fallen sharply since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the wave of financial sanctions imposed on Moscow.Josh Lipsky, vice president and chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council, said that 'this is a China-related threat, the way I read it. And China will read it that way.' However, he also noted that Trump was unlikely to follow through with new tariffs in the near term because that would derail his planned trip to Beijing to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping in mid-May.