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For Konstantin, a 53‑year‑old resident of St Petersburg, the war in Ukraine has become a literal scent in the air. Over the past fortnight he has repeatedly detected the acrid odor of burning crude, fuel and chemicals drifting from Ukrainian drone strikes on Russia’s two largest Baltic oil terminals. The facilities at Ust‑Luga and Primorsk together handle about 40% of Moscow’s seaborne oil exports and roughly 2% of global oil supply, according to the International Energy Agency. Both ports lie within 150 km of St Petersburg, making the smoke visible – and smelt – to locals. Ukrainian drones have flown more than 1,000 km from the front lines to strike storage tanks and loading infrastructure, igniting fires that have burned for days. The smell, described by Konstantin as a mix of diesel exhaust, burning plastic and rotten eggs, first appeared in late March. These attacks are a key element of Kyiv’s strategy to erode Russia’s “unexpected windfall” from oil exports, a revenue stream that has surged as the US‑Israel campaign against Iran pushed global oil prices higher. Satellite imagery shows extensive damage at both terminals, with Ust‑Luga’s sprawling processing complex blackened by fire. As a result, both ports are currently unable to dispatch cargo, forcing traders to reroute oil to smaller Baltic and Black Sea ports that lack the capacity to absorb the displaced volume. Financial analysts estimate that the disruption has already cost Moscow roughly $1 billion in lost export earnings, according to Bloomberg data released on March 31. Moreover, every $10 rise in global oil prices translates into about $1.6 billion of additional monthly income for the Kremlin. Russian officials have blamed European nations for allegedly facilitating the drone overflights, but Ukrainian experts dispute this claim. Andrey Pronin, a pioneer of Ukraine’s drone warfare, emphasized that the strikes are meticulously planned to stay within Russian airspace, bypassing air‑defence systems. Since the campaign began, Ukrainian forces have targeted 13 oil sites, seriously damaging at least eight refineries from the Baltic coast to the Volga region. The attacks are timed to coincide with the heightened profitability Russia enjoys from the Iran‑related oil price surge, according to researcher Nikolay Mitrokhin of Bremen University. Beyond the immediate economic impact, Kyiv views the strikes as leverage in negotiations with Moscow. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has floated the idea of a temporary moratorium on attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in exchange for concessions, though the strategy also inadvertently benefits Iran by sustaining higher oil prices. On the tactical side, Ukraine now relies heavily on FP‑1 drones produced by the domestic Firepoint company. These unmanned aircraft can carry up to 120 kg of explosives and travel roughly 1,500 km, enabling strikes deep inside Russian territory. For civilians living near the conflict zones, the nightly “fireworks” of explosions have become a grim routine. Abdulla, a Tatar resident of Crimea, described the constant shelling as a new normal, while analysts note that President Vladimir Putin remains resolute, using the ongoing talks with the White House as a diplomatic façade. Overall, the Ukrainian drone campaign illustrates how modern warfare increasingly intertwines kinetic attacks with strategic economic disruption, reshaping the dynamics of the Russia‑Ukraine war and its broader geopolitical reverberations.

Ukraine's military has launched a significant drone strike on Russian energy infrastructure in the Black Sea, targeting the port of Novorossiysk. According to Ukrainian drone forces commander Robert Brovdi, the overnight attack hit the Admiral Makarov missile carrier in the port, which serves as Russia's largest oil exporting outlet on the Black Sea.The attack is part of Ukraine's broader strategy to disrupt Russian energy exports and reduce Moscow's revenues. Ukraine has increased its attacks on Russian energy infrastructure in recent weeks, aiming to halt Russian oil exports and impact the Russian economy.Russian authorities reported that at least eight people, including two children, were injured in Novorossiysk. Videos posted on Telegram showed a fire at one of the oil port's docks. Novorossiysk Mayor Andrei Kravchenko stated that debris from drones had fallen on two locations in the city, including a residential area.Russia's military claimed that air defense units had downed 148 Ukrainian drones over a three-hour period. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal, located in the Novorossiysk port area, exports oil from Kazakhstan and has major US oil companies, such as Chevron and ExxonMobil, as shareholders.The attack on Novorossiysk comes amid a series of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil infrastructure. On the previous day, Ukrainian drones struck Russia's Baltic Sea port of Primorsk and the NORSI oil refinery in Nizhny Novgorod. These attacks are part of Ukraine's efforts to reduce Moscow's revenues from oil sales, which are crucial for the Russian economy.In response to the attacks, Russia's Ministry of Defence accused Ukraine of deliberately targeting the CPC terminal to inflict economic damage on its largest shareholders, including US and Kazakh energy companies.

When President Donald Trump inaugurated Operation Epic Fury with Israel on 28 February, his administration outlined broad goals: neutralise Iran’s missile programme, cripple its navy and prevent a nuclear breakout. Within a month those objectives morphed, expanded and at times directly contradicted each other. On 29 March, aboard Air Force One, Trump told reporters that Iran had accepted most of Washington’s 15‑point demand list, conveyed through Pakistan, and even shipped oil to the United States as a goodwill gesture. In the same interview he floated the idea of seizing Kharg Island—the hub for 90 % of Iran’s oil exports—stating, “maybe we take Kharg Island, maybe we don’t. We have a lot of options.” The following day, 30 March, Trump posted on Truth Social that the United States was in “serious discussions with a new, more reasonable regime” in Tehran and claimed “great progress.” He simultaneously warned that, absent a swift deal, the U.S. would destroy Iran’s power plants, oil wells, Kharg Island and even its desalination facilities, and would force the Strait of Hormuz to reopen immediately. By 31 March, with U.S. gasoline prices climbing above $4 per gallon, Trump hinted at a rapid withdrawal, saying the U.S. would leave Iran “within two or three weeks.” He told European allies that if they needed oil or gas they could “go up through the Hormuz Strait” on their own, and rebuked the United Kingdom for not standing up for itself. On 1 April, Trump claimed on Truth Social that Iran’s new leadership had requested a U.S. cease‑fire, but only after the Hormuz Strait was “open, free, and clear.” He reiterated that the war was “not about oil,” yet threatened to blast Iran’s electric grid “back to the stone ages.” Iran’s foreign ministry dismissed the cease‑fire request as “false and baseless,” and the Revolutionary Guard warned the strait remained under its control. Following a U.S.–Israeli strike that demolished a bridge between Tehran and Karaj on 2 April, Trump posted that the next targets would be “bridges, then electric power plants,” signalling an escalation despite earlier talk of withdrawal. Finally, on 3 April, he suggested that reopening Hormuz and seizing Iranian oil could become a “gusher for the world,” a stark reversal of his earlier assertion that the conflict had nothing to do with oil. These rapid shifts illustrate a pattern of policy flip‑flopping that complicates diplomatic efforts, fuels market uncertainty, and raises questions about the strategic coherence of the U.S. approach to the Iran war.

Ukraine has made significant gains on the battlefield, halving the Russian rate of advance in the past three months and reclaiming 470sq km of occupied territory this year. The country's military has also dealt a major blow to Russia's oil export capacity, striking key terminals and refineries, including Ust-Luga and Primorsk, which account for about 60% of Russia's oil export capacity.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has secured agreements with several Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, to export Ukrainian drone know-how in return for joint drone production support. This has enabled Ukraine to increase its drone production and effectively counter Russian advances.The Ukrainian military has also targeted Russian munitions production, striking the Promsintez explosives plant in the Samara region, which produces 30,000 tonnes of military explosives annually. According to estimates, Russia has lost 45% of its missile production capacity due to Ukrainian strikes.In response to Ukrainian attacks, Russia has begun to extend its drone strikes throughout the day, imitating Iran's tactics against the US and Israel. However, Ukraine has successfully shot down over 90% of the drones launched by Russia.

The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has raised concerns about a potential global food crisis due to its impact on fertiliser supplies. The strait is a critical passage for 20% of global natural gas shipments and a third of the global trade in raw materials for fertiliser.The head of the International Rescue Committee, David Miliband, has warned that the situation is a 'food security timebomb', with the window to avert a massive global hunger crisis rapidly closing.Fertiliser prices have already risen by more than 60% in Egypt, reaching $780 (£586) a tonne, up from about $484 in late February. The Qatar Fertiliser Company (QAFCO), the world's largest single site for urea exports, has been offline for almost a month.The Middle East is the source of about 45% of the global trade in sulphur, a key raw material for fertiliser manufacture. Iran is the fourth-largest global exporter of urea, the most widely used nitrogen fertiliser.A prolonged transport shutdown could disrupt production and increase costs, leading to higher food prices and exacerbating global hunger. The world's poorest countries are among the most vulnerable to fertiliser price rises.

The global energy landscape is facing a significant challenge: meeting the increasing demand for energy while reducing carbon emissions. As the world grapples with this dilemma, Russia's role in bridging the global energy gap has become a topic of interest. With its vast energy resources, Russia has the potential to play a crucial role in ensuring global energy security. The country's energy sector is a significant contributor to its economy, and its exports of oil, natural gas, and other energy commodities are essential to meeting the energy needs of many countries. However, Russia's ability to fill the global energy gap depends on various factors, including its production capacity, investment in the energy sector, and geopolitical relationships with other countries. As the global energy market continues to evolve, Russia's role in shaping the future of energy production and consumption will be closely watched.

Kenya's tea industry is experiencing a severe crisis as a result of the escalating tensions between the United States and Israel against Iran. The conflict has significantly impacted the global economy, and Kenya's tea sector is no exception. The US-Israeli war on Iran has led to increased uncertainty and volatility in the global market, affecting Kenya's tea exports. As one of the world's largest tea producers, Kenya relies heavily on international trade for its tea. The crisis has raised concerns about the future of Kenya's tea industry, which is a significant contributor to the country's economy. The industry provides employment opportunities for thousands of Kenyans and generates substantial revenue for the government. The situation is being closely monitored by industry stakeholders and government officials, who are working to mitigate the effects of the crisis on the tea sector. Potential solutions and strategies are being explored to help Kenya's tea industry recover and stabilize in the face of this challenge.

Britain is confronting the most severe energy shock since the early 1970s, as exports of oil, gas and fertiliser from the Middle East have abruptly stopped. The government says a response plan exists, but details remain vague. It is unclear whether the UK is better prepared for the fallout from Donald Trump’s war with Iran than it was for the pandemic six years ago. Ministers are sending a "we have your back" message to the public while simultaneously signalling to financial markets that any assistance will be limited and targeted. Contingency planning is especially difficult when dealing with an unpredictable leader like Trump. Britain’s heavy reliance on imported energy and food means that reassurance can only hold for a short time. The economy entered the conflict already on shaky ground: unemployment rose steadily throughout 2025 and growth stalled to a virtual standstill in the final quarter of that year. The sudden loss of Middle‑East energy and fertiliser supplies now adds a colossal supply shock. Last year, Trump’s “liberation day” tariff hikes served as a dry run for a far more serious confrontation. This time, the war is taking place in a region that is both volatile and crucial to the global economy. In the past two weeks, the repercussions have been felt across Asia – the Philippines declared a state of emergency, Sri Lanka introduced a four‑day work week, and South Korea announced budget measures to help households cope with soaring energy bills. The continent is the most dependent on Gulf‑exported energy, making the impact there the sharpest. The International Monetary Fund warned that the shock will drive higher prices and slower growth worldwide. Shortages push fuel and food prices up, eroding disposable income, prompting businesses to cut staff, and increasing the risk of recession. The UK, already projected to be one of the poorest‑performing major economies in 2026, could see its fresh graduate cohort face a brutal job market. Trump’s claim that the war could end within two or three weeks appears desperate. Even a rapid cease‑fire would leave substantial collateral damage, creating a stagflation scenario that could hurt Republican prospects in the upcoming mid‑term elections. British officials hope a swift resolution will limit economic damage, allowing a short‑term inflation spike to subside and the Bank of England to resume interest‑rate cuts. Treasury plans include scrapping the planned autumn fuel‑duty rise and providing targeted help for the poorest households, though the path is unlikely to be that simple. Currently, the Treasury is hesitant to act boldly for fear of unsettling bond markets. History – the 2008 banking collapse and the 2020 pandemic – shows that governments can act decisively without triggering a market backlash, using tools such as aggressive rate cuts, increased borrowing, and quantitative easing. The Bank of England has warned of a "substantial negative supply shock" and is expected to soften markets for future rate cuts, which are inevitable. Finance Minister Rachel Reeves could mitigate labour‑market pain by reversing recent increases in employers’ National Insurance contributions, subsidising public transport, and even lowering speed limits to conserve energy. The war, like the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, underscores the fragility of global supply chains and the need for greater British self‑reliance. Investing heavily in renewable energy is essential, but the UK also imports roughly 40% of its food and has not run a manufacturing trade surplus since 1982. In a world of disrupted supply lines, a robust plan for economic self‑sufficiency is more urgent than ever. Larry Elliott is a Guardian columnist.

Closing the Strait of Hormuz has choked a vital artery that carries roughly one‑fifth of the world’s crude oil and LNG, sending energy prices soaring and unsettling global trade. Even if the waterway reopens tomorrow, analysts say the ripple effects will endure for months. Nils Haupt, senior director of corporate communications at German carrier Hapag‑Lloyd, told Al Jazeera that the end of hostilities does not equate to the end of logistics challenges. “Once the bombardments stop, the real work begins,” he said, noting that hundreds of vessels will scramble for berths in Persian Gulf ports, creating a prolonged bottleneck for containers and bulk cargo. According to the International Maritime Organization, about 2,000 ships are currently stranded because of Iran’s partial blockade, with only a handful of vessels from “friendly” nations granted passage. Maritime‑intelligence firm Windward estimates that roughly 400 of those ships are anchored in the Gulf of Oman, waiting for a green light. Diverted traffic has already forced many carriers to reroute via the Suez Canal or take the far longer Cape of Good Hope passage, inflating transit times and costs for shipments bound for Asia and Europe. Oil exports from Saudi Arabia are now being sent around the Red Sea, bypassing the strait entirely. Svein Ringbakken, managing director of the Norwegian Shipowners’ Mutual War Risks Association, cautioned that even with ports operating at full capacity, clearing the backlog of oil, gas and other goods will take months. He added that repeated attacks on regional energy and transport infrastructure have compounded the problem. The International Energy Agency reports that more than 40 energy assets across the Middle East have suffered “severe or very severe” damage, prompting companies such as QatarEnergy, Kuwait Petroleum Company and Bahrain’s Bapco Energies to declare force majeure. Beyond the immediate loss of flow, the shutdown has disrupted exports of petrochemicals, fertilisers and raw materials essential for plastics production, further straining global supply chains. Industry leaders warn that the risk landscape has fundamentally shifted. SV Anchan, chairman of US‑based logistics group Safesea, highlighted the rise of asymmetric threats, including unmanned vessel attacks, which have already accounted for at least 18 confirmed assaults since the conflict began. “A full reopening will only bring normalcy after a sustained period of stability and credible security guarantees,” Anchan said. Insurance costs have exploded as a result. Marco Forgione of the Chartered Institute of Export & International Trade noted that hull and cargo premiums have surged up to 300 %, a pressure point that could force shipping firms to curtail operations if rates remain high. Oscar Seikaly, CEO of NSI Insurance Group, stressed that war‑risk coverage will only normalize when a “truly permanent” security solution is in place, not a partial one. Recent data from Lloyd’s List show that a few vessels have managed to obtain Tehran’s permission to transit, with one ship reportedly paying $2 million for the right to pass. Iranian lawmakers have also moved to formalise transit fees for the strait. Nick Marro, lead global‑trade analyst at the Economist Intelligence Unit, warned that the security guarantees demanded by shippers may be hard to meet, citing the volatile Red Sea experience where commercial traffic remains below pre‑2023 levels. Marro predicts that the Hormuz shutdown will accelerate a broader trend of route diversification, similar to the supply‑chain shifts triggered by the COVID‑19 pandemic. “Geopolitical uncertainty will become a permanent feature of risk management, not a temporary reaction,” he said. Seikaly echoed this outlook, suggesting that exporters will increasingly explore alternative corridors for strategic and political reasons, ultimately reducing traffic through the Strait of Hormuz over the long term.