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Karim Baksh of Dasht, a remote Balochistan village, once relied on a diesel‑powered pump to irrigate his watermelon fields. After the 2022 Russia‑Ukraine war drove diesel prices sky‑high, he could no longer afford the fuel, forcing him to cut back his cultivated area. In 2023 he took a gamble: borrowing 300,000 Pakistani rupees (≈ $1,075) from relatives and installing a modest row of solar panels. Three years later, the panels run his pump without diesel, letting him water his crops even as global oil markets tumble amid the US‑Israel war on Iran and the temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of world oil and gas normally flows. Baksh’s experience reflects a broader national shift. Pakistan imports about 80% of its oil via the Hormuz chokepoint and sources 99% of its LNG from Qatar and the UAE. A Council on Foreign Relations report warns that a prolonged closure could trigger severe power shortages, factory shutdowns, and transport disruptions. Yet a quiet solar revolution is building resilience. Since 2018, rooftop solar installations have saved Pakistan over $12 billion in fuel imports, and at current prices the sector is projected to save another $6.3 billion this year alone. According to the independent think‑tank EMBER, solar’s share of the national energy mix surged from 2.9% in 2020 to 32.3% in 2025. This growth is not the result of a single government plan but of millions of individual decisions—farmers swapping diesel pumps, businesses installing panels, and households seeking reliable electricity. In urban centres such as Lahore and Karachi, solar rooftops are commonplace. Homeowners typically recoup installation costs within a few years, enjoy free electricity thereafter, and can even sell surplus power back to the grid through net‑metering. By 2025, 25% of Pakistani households use solar in some form, up from 15% in 2023, with over 280,000 consumers now participating in net‑metering schemes. However, the benefits are uneven. The upfront cost of a 3 kW system—about 450,000 rupees ($1,610)—and larger commercial setups costing up to 2.2 million rupees ($7,874) remain out of reach for many low‑income families. Analysts warn that non‑solar users, largely poorer households, are subsidising the grid usage of solar owners. Net‑metering has already shifted an estimated 159 billion rupees (≈ $570 million) of costs onto other consumers, raising concerns about a two‑tier energy system. The rapid expansion is powered largely by imports from China, which controls roughly 80% of the global solar supply chain. Chinese lithium‑ion batteries, now 20% cheaper than in 2024, enable storage for nighttime use, further reducing reliance on the national grid. Solar panel prices have plummeted: from 100‑120 rupees per watt in the early 2010s to about 30 rupees per watt today. This price collapse, combined with electricity shortages and rising tariffs after the 2022 oil price spike, made solar an attractive alternative for those able to invest. Government policy has been mixed. A 2015 net‑metering scheme encouraged adoption by offering roughly 25 rupees ($0.090) per kilowatt‑hour for exported power and by reducing import taxes on panels. More recently, concerns over the financial strain on the power sector led to a cut in the buy‑back rate to about 10 rupees ($0.036) per kilowatt‑hour. For Baksh, the policy shifts matter little. His solar‑powered pump guarantees water for his watermelons regardless of diesel price swings or geopolitical turmoil. He plans to expand his solar array, increase production, and ship his harvest to larger markets in Quetta and Karachi. In a region where temperatures can soar to 51 °C (124 °F), the sun has become a reliable ally—ensuring that, for farmers like Baksh, “the water keeps flowing no matter what.”

President Donald Trump issued an ultimatum demanding that Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz by 8 p.m. Eastern Time on April 7 (midnight GMT on April 8) or face the destruction of national power plants and major bridges.This demand mirrors a March 21 warning in which Trump threatened to strike Iran’s power plants – “the biggest one first” – if the waterway was not fully reopened within 48 hours.Since then, the deadline has been extended several times, with the White House citing progress in secret negotiations aimed at ending the ongoing conflict, a claim Iran publicly denies.While Trump has repeatedly declared that Iran would “lose every power plant and every other plant they have in the whole country,” he has not identified specific facilities as targets.The president has also threatened to demolish Iran’s bridges; a recent U.S.–Israeli strike damaged the B1 bridge in Karaj, a high‑profile structure slated for inauguration, underscoring the tangible risk to civilian infrastructure.Legal analysts warn that such attacks could constitute “collective punishment,” a practice prohibited under international humanitarian law.Iran’s electricity network comprises hundreds of power stations that together form one of the Middle East’s largest grids, supplying power to approximately 92 million people. Most facilities cluster around major population centres—Tehran, Mashhad, and Isfahan—where demand is highest.The generation mix is dominated by natural‑gas‑fired plants, supplemented by coal, oil, hydro, and a single nuclear facility. In the north and centre of the country, dense clusters of gas‑fired stations serve Tehran, Karaj, Isfahan and Mashhad.Along the Gulf coast, a second concentration of plants benefits from proximity to vast gas fields and ports, enabling large thermal stations to operate on abundant natural gas. This coastal belt also hosts the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, Iran’s only nuclear reactor with a capacity of 1,000 MW, a site that has been repeatedly targeted by U.S. and Israeli forces, raising concerns about potential radioactive fallout.Hydropower generation is centred on a series of dams along the Karun River, the country’s primary source of hydroelectric power.All electricity is transmitted through a national grid managed by the Iran Grid Management Company, delivering power to cities, industry and households.A map of Iranian power stations with capacities of 100 MW or more shows that a single 100 MW plant can typically supply electricity to 75,000–100,000 homes, depending on consumption patterns.The nation’s largest facility is the Damavand Power Plant in Pakdasht, about 50 km southeast of Tehran, boasting a capacity of 2,868 MW—enough to energise more than two million homes.Key high‑capacity plants include:Damavand (Pakdasht) – Natural‑gas combined‑cycle, 2,868 MW.Shahid Salimi – Neka, Caspian Sea coast, natural gas, 2,215 MW.Shahid Rajaee – Near Qazvin, natural gas, 2,043 MW.Karun‑3 Dam – Khuzestan Province, hydropower, 2,000 MW.Kerman – Natural gas, 1,912 MW.Other strategically important stations are the Ramin Power Plant (1,903 MW, gas), the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (1,000 MW, nuclear), and the Bandar Abbas Power Plant (1,330 MW, oil) near the Strait of Hormuz.Iran’s electricity generation is heavily fossil‑fuel dependent: in 2025, 86 % of power came from natural gas, 7 % from oil‑fired plants, about 5 % from hydropower, 2 % from nuclear, and less than 1 % from solar and wind. This makes Iran one of the world’s most gas‑reliant power systems.Targeting the grid would therefore cripple energy supply for millions, disrupt industrial output, and could trigger a humanitarian crisis, while also escalating geopolitical tensions in an already volatile region.

At the start of 2026 Pakistan was sitting on a surplus of imported liquefied natural gas (LNG). Three consecutive years of falling demand – from a peak of 8.2 million tonnes in 2021 to 6.1 million tonnes by late 2025 – were driven by cheap solar panels and reduced industrial activity. The government responded by quietly selling excess cargoes abroad and shutting down domestic wells to avoid over‑pressurising pipelines. Any gas that could not be diverted would have been pushed into household networks at a loss, adding billions to the sector’s crippling debt. Everything changed on 28 February when the United States and Israel launched the "Epic Fury" operation against Iran. The strikes killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and targeted missile sites, air defences and military infrastructure. Iran retaliated with hundreds of missiles and drones, choking traffic through the Strait of Hormuz – a chokepoint for roughly 20 % of global oil and gas. As part of its retaliation, Iranian drones hit Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City on 2 March, the world’s largest LNG export hub. Qatar, the second‑largest LNG exporter after the United States, declared force majeure and halted all production, releasing it from contractual delivery obligations. The fallout was immediate. Qatar’s forced shutdown cut its LNG output by 17 % and disrupted the supply chain that fuels Pakistan, which sources almost all of its imported gas from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Pakistan’s LNG arrivals plummeted from 12 shipments in January to just two in March. Monthly cargo data from the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) show that the country received between eight and twelve shipments a month through 2025, but only two arrived after the conflict began. Price pressure followed. On 13 February state‑owned Pakistan State Oil and Pakistan LNG Limited bought eight cargoes at an average of $10.47 per MMBtu (totaling $257.1 million). By 12 March the two cargoes that did arrive cost $12.49 per MMBtu – a 19 % increase in just one month. Long‑term contracts have left Pakistan with little flexibility. Two government‑to‑government agreements with Qatar, spanning 15 and 10 years, commit the country to nine shipments a month. Even as domestic demand fell – LNG’s share of Asian markets dropped from ~30 % in 2020 to ~18 % in 2025 – the contracts remained binding. Solarisation has been a double‑edged sword. By 2025 Pakistan installed 34 GW of solar capacity, with about 25 GW feeding the national grid, driving an 11 % decline in overall electricity demand between 2022 and 2025. Gas‑fired power plants built for imported LNG are now under‑utilised, especially during daylight hours. Analysts warn that the surplus was predictable. “Pakistan’s energy planning has been locked into long‑term contracts with little room for adjustment,” says Haneea Isaad of the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA). The resulting circular debt now stands at 3.3 trillion rupees (≈ $11 billion), and the government is negotiating to off‑load 177 unwanted shipments worth $5.6 billion through 2031. With Qatar’s LNG shipments effectively halted, the country faces a potential shortfall of more than 21 % of its power generation capacity. The National Electric Power Regulatory Authority confirmed that LNG supplies are under force majeure, while coal imports from South Africa and Indonesia continue. To mitigate the gap, Pakistan is reviving domestic gas production that had been throttled during the surplus period. Roughly 350–400 million cubic feet per day of domestic gas were previously held back for LNG imports, now being released to the grid. Nevertheless, analysts caution that even with restored domestic gas, imported coal and hydropower, “the energy shortage may persist, especially during the peak summer months.” Summer pressure is already building. The State of Industry Report 2025 recorded peak electricity demand of over 33,000 MW last summer, while winter demand sits around 15,000 MW, helped by solar generation of 9,000–10,000 MW daily. Furnace oil, the primary backup fuel, now costs 35 rupees per unit (≈ $0.12), more than double since the Strait of Hormuz disruption. Consumers with grid electricity face higher bills and possible outages; industrial users reliant on gas risk production cuts; those equipped with rooftop solar and battery storage are best insulated. “Returning to the spot market is unlikely given Pakistan’s dire financial position, and competing with wealthier nations would price the country out,” Isaad warns. “The realistic outcome may be planned load‑shedding of two to three hours daily.”