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The strategic Strait of Hormuz, linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, has become the focal point of the Israel‑U.S. war on Iran that began in February. In peacetime the narrow waterway handled about 20% of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments without any tolls, but the conflict has turned it into a contested zone. After a series of Israeli and U.S. strikes, Iran retaliated by targeting merchant vessels it deemed hostile, effectively shutting the passage and triggering one of the most severe energy‑distribution crises in recent memory. While a two‑week ceasefire, brokered by Pakistan, was declared on Tuesday, Tehran has issued a set of official terms that would govern the strait moving forward. According to Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghi, safe passage will be allowed in coordination with the Iranian armed forces and subject to technical limitations. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has even published a new navigation map that pushes traffic farther north, away from the traditional route near Oman’s coast, citing the risk of anti‑ship mines. Central to Tehran’s 10‑point peace proposal is the idea of charging fees for strait usage. Iranian media report that the plan could levy up to $2 million per vessel—a sum to be shared with Oman—or a charge of $1 per barrel of oil shipped. The revenue would allegedly fund reconstruction of military and civilian infrastructure damaged by the U.S.–Israeli campaign. Oman has publicly rejected any toll scheme, with Transport Minister Said Al‑Maawali reminding that the country has already signed all relevant international maritime transport agreements that prohibit such fees. International law adds another layer of complexity. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) prohibits levying charges for mere passage through international straits, allowing fees only for services like navigation assistance or port use. Neither the United States nor Iran have ratified UNCLOS, but the principle remains a benchmark for maritime norms. Analysts suggest a possible workaround: charging for de‑mining and safety services rather than for passage itself, which could be permissible under existing legal frameworks. The proposal has sparked diplomatic pushback. At the United Nations Security Council, Bahrain led a resolution urging coordinated reopening of the strait, backed by Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan. The resolution passed with 11 of 15 votes, but was vetoed by Russia and China, who argued it unfairly targeted Iran and ignored the initial strikes. Beyond the region, the United States is unlikely to accept indefinite tolls. Former President Donald Trump, who announced the ceasefire, warned that U.S. forces would remain in the area and threatened to resume attacks if negotiations faltered. American troops are reportedly “hanging around” to assist with traffic buildup, though the extent of their operational control remains unclear. Maritime analyst C. Uday Bhaskar notes that only three to five ships have traversed the strait since the ceasefire began, underscoring the lingering uncertainty for global shippers. He adds that ship owners facing multi‑million‑dollar losses each day may ultimately acquiesce to Iran’s terms, at least temporarily. Should Iran implement a toll regime, the immediate impact would fall on Gulf oil‑producing nations, but the ripple effects could destabilize global energy markets, already strained by supply shocks. Major powers such as the United Kingdom have been coordinating with a coalition of 40 countries to explore alternative mechanisms for reopening the waterway without conceding to tolls. In sum, Iran’s proposed protocol for the Strait of Hormuz introduces a contentious new variable into an already volatile geopolitical landscape, pitting national security interests against established maritime law and the broader stability of world energy supplies.

The global energy crisis has been labeled 'the mother of all crises' by Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar, as tensions in the Strait of Hormuz continue to escalate. The crisis, sparked by Iran's retaliatory blocking of the strait, has significant implications for global energy supplies and security.Bayraktar, in an exclusive interview with Al Jazeera Arabic, highlighted the importance of diversifying energy routes to mitigate the impact of such crises. He noted that Turkey, with its strategic location between Asia and Europe, has become a pivotal country in the region, hosting key pipelines such as the 'Blue Stream' and 'TurkStream'.The minister emphasized that Turkey is well-suited to weather the crisis, with sufficient strategic energy reserves, including gas storage facilities that are 72 percent full, compared to Europe's 28 percent. However, he warned that rising oil and gas prices still burden the state budget, with an increase of $1 per barrel costing Ankara approximately $400 million.Bayraktar also discussed the potential for a new energy architecture to emerge, driven by the need for diversification. He proposed several projects, including the transportation of Turkmen gas across the Caspian Sea to Turkey and Europe, extending the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline to reach Basra, and constructing a natural gas pipeline from Qatar to Turkey.The crisis has significant economic implications, with oil prices potentially rising to $200 per barrel in a worst-case scenario, which could lead to another global recession. Bayraktar stressed the importance of a lasting peace in the region to stabilize energy markets and prevent further economic damage.

The piece titled The war on Iran: Nobody won, everyone paid examines the aftermath of the recent hostilities involving Iran. It argues that the conflict failed to deliver a decisive victory for any side, while inflicting widespread losses that reverberated throughout the Middle East.By highlighting the shared burdens—ranging from disrupted trade routes to strained diplomatic ties—the analysis underscores how the war deepened regional instability rather than resolving underlying tensions.In sum, the article portrays the Iran war as a costly stalemate, reminding policymakers that the true price of conflict is borne by all parties involved.

Djibouti, a one‑million‑strong nation perched on the Bab al‑Mandeb Strait, is set to hold its presidential election on April 10. All signs point to incumbent Ismail Omar Guelleh securing a sixth term with little genuine opposition. The country’s strategic location—linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden—makes it a linchpin for global trade and a magnet for foreign military installations. The United States, France, China, Italy and Japan all maintain bases there, earning Djibouti the reputation of hosting the highest concentration of overseas military sites. Officially, Djibouti recognizes French and Arabic, while Somali and Afar are widely spoken among the two main ethnic groups, which together comprise roughly 95% of the population. Islam is practiced by about 94% of residents, and the Djiboutian franc remains the national currency. According to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 243,471 citizens—about a quarter of the population—are registered to vote, up from roughly 215,000 in the 2021 poll. Historical turnout averages around 67%. IGAD’s eight‑nation bloc has dispatched 17 observers from Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda to monitor the process, with a post‑vote statement slated for April 12. Ismail Omar Guelleh, 78, leads the ruling People’s Rally for Progress. After parliament lifted the 75‑year age ceiling in November and abolished term limits back in 2010, Guelleh is now eligible for another term. Critics label his rule as authoritarian, yet they also acknowledge the relative stability he has maintained in a volatile region. Guelleh’s administration has turned Djibouti’s lack of natural resources into a revenue engine by signing infrastructure deals with China and leasing military facilities to Western powers. In 2017, Finance Minister Ilyas Dawaleh estimated that the bases generate roughly $125 million annually, with the United States contributing nearly half of that sum. The U.S. installation, Camp Lemonnier, remains the only permanent American base on the continent. The sole challenger, Mohamed Farah Samatar, runs under the Unified Democratic Centre after breaking away from the ruling party. His campaign slogan—“another Djibouti is possible”—has resonated only modestly, and observers such as Horn‑of‑Africa expert Sonia le Gouriellec describe the contest as a “token competition”. Human‑rights advocates echo this sentiment, calling the election a “masquerade” and a foregone conclusion. Key issues dominate the discourse. Democratic freedoms have eroded; opposition parties have boycotted elections since 2016, and Guelleh captured over 90% of the vote in 2021. The country ranks 168th out of 180 in the 2025 Reporters Without Borders press‑freedom index, and allegations of corruption and nepotism persist, including speculation that Guelleh’s stepson, Naguib Abdallah Kamil, is being groomed for succession. Economically, Djibouti’s reliance on Chinese financing is creating fiscal strain. By 2026 the nation owed China roughly $1.2 billion in loans, prompting the IMF to label its debt profile “in distress and unsustainable”. Massive infrastructure projects—most notably a railway to Ethiopia—have failed to curb poverty, with 73% of the youth unemployed. The country’s lifeline is its port system, which handles virtually all of Ethiopia’s maritime trade, amounting to about $2 billion in annual revenue. Ethiopia’s recent flirtation with a Somaliland port deal threatened Djibouti’s monopoly, though a Turkey‑mediated agreement in late 2024 redirected Ethiopia toward a “reliable and sustainable” sea corridor with Somalia. In sum, the upcoming election is less about a competitive political showdown and more about reaffirming a status quo that intertwines Djibouti’s geopolitical leverage, foreign‑military income, and mounting debt challenges.

Prominent Kashmiri separatist Aasiya Andrabi has been handed down three life sentences by an Indian court, a move that has been widely condemned by activists and legal experts. Andrabi, the founder of the banned all-women's organisation Dukhtaran-e-Millat (DeM), was sentenced on March 24 by a special National Investigative Agency (NIA) court in New Delhi.Andrabi, 64, and her two associates, Sofi Fehmeeda and Nahida Nasreen, were arrested by the NIA in 2018 under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), a draconian anti-terror law. The UAPA was introduced in 2008 and amended in 2019 to allow authorities to declare individuals as 'terrorists'. Andrabi was accused of waging war against the Indian government, raising funds for terrorist acts, and being a member of a terrorist group.However, the court found no evidence related to these charges, yet convicted her on less serious allegations such as provoking hostility between communities and undermining national integration. The court noted that while Andrabi's actions did not directly cause violence, they could evoke sentiments that may lead to violence.Legal experts say Andrabi's conviction is mainly based on offensive speech-making, raising questions about India's tolerance of dissenting voices. 'Ideology is not punishable by law; only actions are,' a Kashmir-based legal researcher said. 'But the UAPA's scope has been widened significantly through several amendments.'Andrabi's son described the conviction as 'effectively a death sentence' given her age and time already spent in jail. Her husband, a former rebel leader, has also been imprisoned since 1992. Critics argue that the conviction fits a broader pattern in which all forms of political resistance are disciplined in Kashmir.

The Gulf region breathed a sigh of relief on Tuesday after Iran and the United States agreed to a two-week truce, halting over five weeks of escalating attacks and hostile rhetoric.However, Gulf states are expressing caution, concerned that the US, seeking a swift exit, might agree to terms granting Iran some control over the Strait of Hormuz, a vital waterway through which one fifth of the world's oil and natural liquefied gas passes.Iran had nearly brought traffic through the strait to a standstill in response to joint US-Israeli attacks on its soil since February 28. Under the truce, Iran has agreed to halt attacks for two weeks in exchange for resumed maritime transit in the key waterway.Despite this, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are stressing that any deal must result in a permanent, long-term arrangement to keep the strait open. They fear a weakened yet intact Iranian leadership could use the strait as leverage, leaving them under constant threat of disruption and economic blackmail.“There is a quiet but palpable concern that President Trump, eager for a quick political victory, could tolerate some Iranian leverage over the strait in exchange for a fragile truce, prioritising optics over Gulf realities,” said Hesham Alghannam, a Saudi Arabia-based scholar at the Malcolm H Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center.The GCC countries, which have faced near-daily Iranian missile and drone attacks, have welcomed the truce but emphasize that the Strait of Hormuz must reopen. They are also concerned about Iran's future influence over the strait, with a Bahrain-sponsored UN Security Council resolution calling for countries to use defensive missions to keep the maritime chokepoint open being vetoed by Russia and China.A further escalation could have devastating consequences for the GCC economies, undoing decades of work to make the region a safe hub for finance, tourism, and culture. Analysts say GCC countries have stepped up diplomacy in the lead-up to the conflict, but officials across the region have warned Iran should not mistake their inaction as a sign of weakness.“The Gulf will leave no stone unturned if Iran continues to take the path of aggression,” said Hamad Althunayyan, a political analyst and professor at Kuwait University. “The Gulf expects its interests to be represented, and included, in any deal with Iran.”

Israel has recently carried out strikes on Lebanon, sparking fears of increased hostilities in the region. This development comes at a sensitive time, with a US-brokered ceasefire with Iran in place.The situation in Lebanon remains volatile, with concerns about potential escalation between Israel and Iranian-backed groups. The international community is closely monitoring the situation, as regional stability hangs in the balance.

At a Wednesday briefing, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt framed the ongoing US‑Israel war against Iran as a "test" that NATO failed, hinting that President Donald Trump is weighing a possible withdrawal from the alliance. She quoted the president saying the partnership had turned its back on the American people over the past six weeks. Shortly thereafter, Trump met with NATO Secretary‑General Mark Rutte at the White House. Both described the discussion as "frank and open," with Rutte acknowledging logistical support and base access from allies, but noting the absence of direct military contributions. During a CNN interview, host Jake Tapper asked Rutte whether the president intended to pull the United States out of NATO or at least reduce its backing. Rutte admitted there was disappointment, yet emphasized he had listened carefully to Trump’s arguments and praised the president’s leadership. Since assuming office in 2025, Trump has intensified pressure on NATO members to raise defence spending. At the 2025 NATO summit, members agreed to a non‑binding target of 5 % of GDP by 2035. Spain’s request for an exemption sparked a year‑long public denouncement by Trump. Earlier, Trump threatened to seize the Danish territory of Greenland, claiming its strategic value, though the United States has since softened that stance. Nevertheless, he continues to argue that US control of Greenland is essential, despite opposition from local residents and European leaders. The Wall Street Journal reported that the administration is evaluating the closure of U.S. bases or the redeployment of troops from countries such as Spain and Germany as retaliation for their limited engagement in the Iran conflict. When pressed about a potential NATO exit, Leavitt confirmed that the president "has discussed" the option and may address it after his meeting with Rutte. The president’s relationship with Rutte remains close; the Dutch leader has visited the White House multiple times during Trump’s second term. Rutte warned that NATO "will not work" without U.S. support, underscoring the strategic stakes of any American pull‑back. The unfolding debate highlights a deepening rift between Washington and its European partners at a time when the broader geopolitical landscape is already destabilised by the Iran war.

The conflict in Gaza has resulted in a significant number of amputations, with over 6,000 adults and children undergoing amputations since October 2023, according to the WHO and Palestinian Ministry of Health. Ola Jamal, 36, is one of the many Palestinians who have been forced to flee Gaza due to the conflict. She was breastfeeding her two-month-old son, Zain, when a missile struck al-Nasr hospital in Gaza, causing her to lose her arm. Jamal and her family were forced to separate, with her children being cared for by another family. This traumatic experience has had a lasting impact on Jamal and her children, with her son Zain still experiencing nightmares and trauma two years after the event. Shadi Sharif Ayesh al-Sous, a father of two, lost his leg in a missile strike while collecting firewood. He had his leg amputated above the knee and now waits to return home to Gaza. However, many Palestinians in Egypt face significant challenges, including restricted access to healthcare and prosthetic care due to their uncertain legal status. Yousef El Deeb, a certified prosthetist at Orthomedics in Cairo, says his clinic has treated about 300 Palestinian patients since October 2023, mostly through the support of NGOs. However, the lack of documentation and uncertain legal status of Palestinians in Egypt makes it difficult for them to access long-term prosthetic care without the support of NGOs. The situation for Palestinians in Egypt is further complicated by their lack of formal residency or refugee status. Without valid residency permits, survivors are often restricted to hostels or share a flat with other families, unable to work and living under the constant pressure of temporary status. This lack of documentation makes accessing hi-tech, long-term prosthetic care almost impossible without the support of NGOs.