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The unexpected return of two William Hartnell episodes to the BBC archive has sent shockwaves of excitement through the Whovian community. For the first time since 1965, fans can now enjoy the first quarter of the 12-part adventure 'The Daleks' Master Plan.'The surviving five episodes are now on iPlayer, and the first three make for a stirring introduction to the adventure, with large impressive sets for the Earth control centre and the Dalek ship, contrasting with the dense forbidding foliage of the planet Kembel. Frequent tight closeup shots from director Douglas Camfield on the faces of the cast add to a claustrophobic feel in the jungle sequences.At the time, Hartnell was not to know that within a year he would be 'renewed' as the lead of the show by Patrick Troughton. Hartnell's health problems, reputation for being difficult on set and frequent flubbing of lines during a production schedule that allowed little leeway for second takes has tainted his tenure in the role.Here, especially in the opener, we get to see him in some of his strongest moments as the Doctor. With Stephen (Peter Purves) incapacitated by the poison he picked up in Troy, and Katarina (Adrienne Hill) little more than a hollow vessel of a character, Hartnell has much more to do than usual. The actor gets to show the gleeful side of his nature as he delights at his own invention of the magnetic chair and his ingenuity at repelling – at least initially – boarders to the spaceship.Rediscovering episode one also means we can enjoy beloved children's television presenter Brian Cant flexing his acting chops in something other than Playschool, and all three episodes prominently feature Nicholas Courtney, who would go on to play Brigadier Lethbridge-Stewart for 40 years, as Bret Vyon. A highlight is the Addams family-esque kookiness of the aliens making up the Dalek council, which is certainly preferable to the somewhat cliched prison planet savages set-up of part three.The biggest mystery, of course, is how these episodes have ended up surviving. Film is Fabulous, the people who secured them, have said they are respecting the wishes of the estate of the person who was holding and keeping them anonymous. Perhaps the most intriguing thing is that, given it was never sold overseas, the missing episodes of the Daleks' Master Plan were among the least likely to ever be found, but two episodes were sitting in those film cans all along. Who knows what else might still be out there?

Two long-lost episodes of Doctor Who from the William Hartnell era, which had not been seen since 1965, have been released after being discovered in a private film collection. The episodes, 'The Nightmare Begins' and 'Devil’s Planet', are parts one and three of a mostly lost 12-part adventure called The Daleks’ Master Plan, written by Terry Nation, the creator of the Daleks, and broadcast as part of the third series of Doctor Who in November 1965.The episodes feature Peter Purves as the Doctor’s companion, Stephen. They were recovered by Film is Fabulous, a charitable trust dedicated to securing and preserving private film collections. The original 16mm telerecordings of the two Dalek episodes have been restored and made available on iPlayer in the UK.This discovery marks a significant milestone for fans, as it includes the first appearance of Nicholas Courtney in the show, playing Bret Vyon. Courtney later became a regular character, playing Alistair Gordon Lethbridge-Stewart, known as the Brigadier of Unit. 95 episodes of Doctor Who from the 1960s remain missing from the archives, having been wiped or junked by the BBC during the 1970s.

Legal groups in Uganda have strongly condemned the arrival of a dozen deportees from the United States, calling the deportation process 'undignified, harrowing and dehumanising'. The Uganda Law Society and the East Africa Law Society have taken the matter to court, seeking relief to halt what they describe as 'patent international illegality'.The deportation marks the first confirmed instance of deportees being transferred from the US to Uganda. The 12 individuals reportedly landed at Entebbe International Airport by private aircraft. No identifying information about the deportees has been provided.The deportation is part of President Donald Trump's efforts to offload immigrants to 'third countries' where they have no personal connections. Uganda is one of several countries that have agreed to accept deported foreigners, including Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Rwanda, Eswatini, and South Sudan.The deal with Uganda was confirmed by the country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs last August, stating it was a 'temporary arrangement' with priority given to deportees from other African countries. Unaccompanied children and people with criminal records are excluded from the deal.Critics have raised concerns about the safety of countries receiving US deportees, citing human rights abuses in Uganda. The US has previously criticised Uganda for 'significant human rights abuses', including extrajudicial killings, life-threatening prison conditions, and torture.The Trump administration has defended the deportations as legal under the US Immigration and Nationality Act, citing diplomatic assurances from 'third countries' that deportees would not face persecution. However, the policy has faced numerous legal challenges, with concerns about immigrants' due process rights.

In a recent analysis, the author argues that Lebanon’s accession to the International Criminal Court (ICC) would mark a pivotal step toward greater accountability and international legitimacy. By becoming a State Party, Lebanon could align its judicial framework with the global standards set by the Rome Statute, thereby enhancing the credibility of its legal institutions. The piece highlights three core benefits: first, the ICC’s jurisdiction would provide a mechanism to investigate and prosecute serious crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide that have historically plagued the region. Second, joining the Court would signal Lebanon’s commitment to the rule of law, potentially attracting foreign investment and diplomatic support by demonstrating a stable, rights‑respecting environment. Third, participation could facilitate cooperation with other ICC members, fostering regional dialogue on justice and reconciliation. While acknowledging the political complexities surrounding accession, the author stresses that the long‑term gains—greater judicial independence, deterrence of future atrocities, and improved international relations—outweigh short‑term challenges. The article concludes that embracing ICC membership would not only serve victims of past abuses but also position Lebanon as a proactive contributor to the global fight against impunity.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a comprehensive report titled None Can Run Away, concluding that Burkina Faso’s military, its allied Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDPs), and the al‑Qaeda‑linked Jama’at Nusrat al‑Islam wa al‑Muslimin (JNIM) have perpetrated war crimes and crimes against humanity since the coup that brought the junta to power in September 2022. Through in‑person and telephone interviews with more than 450 witnesses across Burkina Faso, Benin, Ivory Coast, Ghana and Mali, HRW verified 57 distinct incidents involving wilful killing, attacks on civilians and civilian objects, pillage, looting, and forced displacement. The report estimates that 1,837 civilians were killed between January 2023 and August 2025, with over 1,200 deaths directly linked to government forces. The United Nations estimates that the conflict has displaced approximately two million people, underscoring a humanitarian crisis of regional magnitude. Among the deadliest attacks, the military and VDP militias slaughtered more than 400 civilians across 16 villages near the northern town of Djibo in December 2023. In November 2023, allied militias killed 13 Fulani civilians—including six women and four children—in the western village of Basse, employing methods described by survivors as “blindfolded, hands tied, and riddled with bullets.” JNIM’s own atrocities were highlighted by the August 24, 2024 massacre in Barsalogho, where at least 133 civilians, many of them children, were shot indiscriminately. HRW’s findings point to a systematic targeting of the Fulani ethnic group, whom the junta accuses of supporting armed insurgents, resulting in what the report characterises as an ethnic cleansing of entire communities. HRW calls for urgent investigations into President Ibrahim Traoré, the supreme commander of the armed forces, and six senior military commanders for “grave abuses.” The organization also urges scrutiny of Iyad Ag Ghaly, JNIM’s supreme leader wanted by the International Criminal Court, and four of his commanders under the principle of command responsibility. “The scale of atrocities taking place in Burkina Faso is mind‑boggling, as is the lack of global attention to this crisis,” said Philippe Bolopion, executive director of HRW. “The junta is committing horrific abuses itself, failing to hold those responsible on all sides to account, and curtailing reporting to obscure the suffering of civilians caught in the violence.” Survivors recount harrowing details: a 41‑year‑old father described his son’s body “shot in the back of the neck,” while a 39‑year‑old witness to the Barsalogho attack said, “People were falling like flies. They came to exterminate us. They did not spare anyone.” These revelations amplify calls from the international community for accountability and for renewed humanitarian assistance to the millions displaced by the protracted Sahel conflict.

Argentina has taken a significant step in its diplomatic relations with Iran by expelling the Iranian charge d'affaires in Buenos Aires, Mohsen Tehrani. This move comes in response to Iran's rejection of Argentina's decision to blacklist the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a 'terrorist' group.The Foreign Ministry of Argentina stated that Iran's response contained 'false, offensive and unfounded accusations against the Argentinian Republic and its highest authorities.' The ministry emphasized that these statements constitute unacceptable interference in Argentina's internal affairs and a deliberate misrepresentation of decisions adopted in accordance with international law and national law.Iran's Foreign Ministry had condemned Argentina's move against the IRGC, calling it an 'action against Iran's security and national interests.' Tehran accused Argentina of making this decision 'under the influence of inducements and pressures from the genocidal and occupying Zionist regime,' referring to Israel.The designation of the IRGC as a 'terrorist' group by Argentina follows similar moves by the US in 2019 and the European Union in January. Argentina's President Javier Milei, who has taken staunchly pro-Israel positions, described himself as 'the most Zionist president in the world.'The relationship between Argentina and Iran has been strained, particularly over the 1994 bombing of a Jewish centre in Buenos Aires, which an Argentinian court ruled was carried out by Iran. Iran has denied its involvement in the attack.Milei's government cited the 1994 attack in its decision to blacklist the IRGC. The Argentinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused Iran of failing to cooperate with the probe or hand over suspects in the case, stating that 'The Argentine Republic will not tolerate grievances or interference from a State that has systematically failed to comply with its international obligations and that persists in obstructing the progress of justice.'

One year ago, US President Donald Trump introduced a 10% global tariff, sparking a trade war with far-reaching consequences. The immediate impact was severe, with the stock market experiencing its worst drop since the pandemic. In response, countries scrambled to negotiate deals with Washington or retaliate with their own tariffs. Recently, the Supreme Court ruled that most of Trump's tariffs are illegal, citing the president's lack of authority to impose broad, open-ended tariffs under a national emergency. However, this ruling did not end the trade war. Within hours, Trump invoked a different statute to launch a temporary tariff, set to expire in July. The effects of the tariffs have already reshaped the US economy. The average effective US tariff rate surged from 2.6% to over 13%, the highest level since World War II. This significant increase has led to higher costs for American consumers. According to the Tax Foundation, US households paid $1,000 more in 2025 for the same goods. Tarrifs work by imposing a tax on foreign goods and services, making them more expensive and encouraging local purchases. Despite Trump's promise that tariffs would reduce the trade deficit and make the US richer, the reality is that the average US consumer is worse off. The Penn Wharton Budget Model reports that the US collected over $287.1 billion in customs duties in 2025 and $64.4 billion in 2026. Economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York found that nearly 90% of the economic burden from tariffs has fallen on US businesses and consumers, with foreign exporters absorbing only a small percentage of the cost. Lower-income households have been disproportionately affected, as they spend a higher proportion of their earnings on essential goods like food, clothing, and transportation. Following the Supreme Court's ruling, the government may be required to refund up to $175 billion to businesses that paid the tariffs. With Trump's tariffs being replaced by a flat 10% tariff, the Tax Foundation projects that the average cost to US households will fall to about $600. While an improvement, it remains a significant cost for consumers.

The Paris Appeals Court on Wednesday rejected Tunisia's request to extradite Halima Ben Ali, the daughter of the late former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who faces accusations of laundering assets acquired during her father's 1987‑2011 rule.The ruling was anchored in Tunisia's failure to provide guarantees of an independent and impartial trial, a prerequisite under French and international extradition standards.Halima Ben Ali was detained in September 2025 at Tunisia's behest as she prepared to board a flight from Paris to Dubai. Authorities allege she participated in the laundering of wealth amassed under her father's regime.Her lawyer, Samia Maktouf, warned that sending her back would be tantamount to “a death sentence.” After the verdict, Maktouf described the decision as “an immense relief” and affirmed that justice had been served in accordance with the law.Tunisian prosecutors say the alleged financial crimes could carry a sentence of up to 20 years in prison, underscoring the broader push to recover misappropriated assets and hold the Ben Ali family accountable more than a decade after the Arab Spring uprisings.The case revives debate over the legacy of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who was ousted in 2011, fled to Saudi Arabia, died in exile in 2019, and was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment by a Tunisian court.While the French decision may strain diplomatic ties, it also signals Paris' commitment to uphold procedural safeguards when handling extradition requests linked to politically sensitive cases.

Europe’s attention is fixed on Hungary’s parliamentary election scheduled for April 12, a contest many analysts view as a litmus test for the bloc’s cohesion on foreign‑policy, defence, energy and migration. Since coming to power, Prime Minister Viktor Orban has consistently blocked EU initiatives: he has refused to join a common asylum framework, opposed a joint defence scheme, resisted the shift toward renewable‑energy independence while still importing Russian hydrocarbons, and vetoed both Ukraine’s accession talks and a proposed €90 billion low‑interest loan package for Kyiv. These actions have made Hungary the most disruptive member state in the Union, prompting observers to argue that the election’s outcome will reverberate far beyond Budapest’s borders. Greek conservative MP Angelos Syrigos warned that the EU is plagued by “fanatically Trump‑like and pro‑Russian” governments, naming Hungary and Slovakia as examples. He told Al Jazeera that the constant threat of an Orban veto forces other capitals to seek ad‑hoc compromises rather than genuine consensus. Opposition leader Peter Magyar of the Tisza party is campaigning on a pro‑European platform, pledging a binding referendum on Ukraine’s membership, a crackdown on corruption, the release of billions in frozen EU funds, and a reversal of Hungary’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court. Current polls give Tisza roughly 50 % of the vote, a ten‑point lead over the ruling Fidesz, though the political landscape remains fluid. Even a Magyar victory would not automatically resolve the EU’s structural challenges. Other illiberal leaders—such as Slovakia’s Robert Fico and the Czech Republic’s Andrej Babiš—could step into a vacuum of obstructionism. Nevertheless, some scholars argue that Orban’s habit of breaking consensus has forced the Union to become more pragmatic. At a December 2023 summit, EU leaders temporarily excluded Orban to secure unanimous approval of Ukraine’s candidate status, later offering Hungary a €10 billion release of blocked funds as an incentive. Professor Katalin Miklossy of the University of Helsinki explained that the EU has shifted from a rigid, rule‑bound approach to a more flexible, problem‑solving mindset, saying, “We were weak when we clung to the book; now we act more practically.” Should Orban remain in power, the bloc is considering a workaround: issuing 26 bilateral loans to Ukraine from member states, bypassing any single‑country veto. Historical precedent exists. In 2010, when Greece’s debt crisis threatened the euro, EU members created the Greek Loan Facility—an ad‑hoc series of bilateral loans that compensated for the lack of a common rescue fund. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has warned that delays in funding could leave the Ukrainian army under‑resourced, underscoring the geopolitical stakes of the Hungarian vote. The EU’s inability to move from unanimity to qualified‑majority voting—an ambition thwarted by failed French and Dutch referenda in 2005—has amplified Orban’s leverage. Yet the Union continues to evolve, having launched a common bond in 2020 to revive the pandemic‑hit economy and, since Russia’s 2022 invasion, channeling resources into a nascent European defence union. Orban’s recent reversal on the €90 billion Ukraine loan—after Kyiv refused to repair the Druzhba pipeline damaged by a Russian bomb—illustrates the volatility of his stance. He initially agreed to the loan in December, on the condition that Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic would not be required to co‑sign, only to withdraw support a month later. Even if Magyar secures a parliamentary majority, the promised loan may not materialise immediately. Cambridge‑based expert Victoria Vdovychenko notes that a decision made in December 2025 to disburse funds from January 2026 has already stalled, with the next realistic window possibly in June. Academics stress that a Tisza victory would deliver a psychological boost to the EU and its trans‑Atlantic partners, injecting confidence into a system battling “stealth creep of illiberalism” and economic disenfranchisement. Professor SM Amadae of Cambridge’s Centre for the Study of Existential Risk warned that while a change in Hungary could energise citizens, the entrenched gerrymandering and patronage networks of Fidesz present formidable obstacles to lasting reform. In sum, the April 12 election is more than a domestic contest; it is a pivotal moment that could reshape the EU’s decision‑making architecture, determine the flow of critical aid to Ukraine, and signal the future trajectory of populist politics across Europe.