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Gina Rinehart, Australia's richest person, has been dealt a significant blow with a court ruling that her company, Hancock Prospecting, must pay hundreds of millions of dollars in royalties to a rival mining family, Wright Prospecting.The Western Australian supreme court decision, which came on Wednesday, found that Wright Prospecting was entitled to a half share of royalties from the Hope Downs iron ore project, a joint venture between Rio Tinto and Hancock Prospecting.Hope Downs is a major mining project that exports around 45 million tonnes of iron ore annually from Australia's north-west. The court's ruling is a significant setback for Rinehart, who has been embroiled in a long-standing dispute with the Wright family over mining assets and royalties.The case, which began in 2010, has been a complex and lengthy battle, with multiple parties involved and over 4,000 documents submitted during the trial. The judge's findings, which ran to over 1,650 pages, noted that the dispute required a 'lengthy, diverse, and detailed reconstruction of events' dating back to the 1960s.Rinehart's company, Hancock Prospecting, has estimated that the historical payments to Wright Prospecting could be around $14 million per year, while the Wright camp estimates the amount could near $1 billion. The amount Hancock Prospecting and Rio Tinto are liable to pay will be the subject of a future hearing.The decision has been claimed as a partial victory by all parties involved, with Wright Prospecting welcoming the ruling and Hancock Prospecting declaring victory on the issue of ownership rights over the valuable assets.The 16-year court case may still have many years yet to play out, with neither side ruling out appealing against the verdict.

Tehran has issued an uncompromising demand for $270 billion in reparations for the devastation wrought by United States and Israeli strikes since the war began on 28 February. The figure, disclosed by government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani in an interview with Russia’s RIA Novosti, aggregates both direct and indirect losses across a wide range of sectors. Iran’s UN envoy asserted that five regional states must contribute to the compensation, alleging that their territories served as launchpads for attacks on Iranian soil. In parallel, Tehran floated a Strait of Hormuz protocol that would levy a tax on vessels transiting the strategic waterway, earmarking the proceeds for reconstruction. The war has battered Iran’s critical infrastructure: oil and gas complexes, petrochemical plants, steel and aluminium factories, as well as military installations have been repeatedly struck. Damage extends to bridges, ports, railways, universities, research centres, power stations and desalination plants, while countless hospitals, schools and civilian homes have been either damaged or razed. In the aviation sector, Maghsoud Asadi Samani, secretary of the Association of Iranian Airlines, reported that 60 civilian aircraft have been rendered inoperable, with 20 completely destroyed. Iran now operates roughly 160 passenger planes, many of which are decades old and suffer from parts shortages due to stringent US sanctions. The airline industry estimates losses exceeding 300 trillion rials (≈ $190 million) over just 40 days of conflict, compounded by the loss of anticipated revenue from the Nowruz holiday period. Despite the extensive damage, Iranian officials have signalled no willingness to make major concessions in forthcoming negotiations with Washington, including on nuclear enrichment. Hard‑line parliament spokesman Ebrahim Rezaei warned that extending the recent two‑week ceasefire would merely allow the US and Israel to replenish their arsenals, urging the United States to either recognise Iran’s rights—particularly over the Strait of Hormuz—or return to hostilities. Financially, Iran allocated close to $8 billion to its military in 2024, according to SIPRI, and has pledged to triple that budget following previous missile exchanges with Israel. Yet the economy remains strained by years of sanctions, mismanagement and corruption. Compounding the economic strain, the government‑imposed near‑total internet shutdown—affecting over 90 million users—has been estimated to cost the nation up to $80 million per day. Afshin Kolahi of the Iran Chamber of Commerce warned that the blackout equates to losing the output of four B1‑class bridges and two medium‑capacity power plants each day. While a limited “Internet Pro” service is being offered to select users, the majority of the population remains confined to a state‑controlled intranet, prompting widespread calls for internet freedom. These intertwined military, economic and digital pressures underscore the high stakes of the anticipated US‑Iran talks, with Tehran demanding acknowledgment of its losses and a pathway to rebuild a war‑torn nation.

The United States is exploring multiple avenues to broker a ceasefire and bring an end to the conflict. According to John Feehery, there are seven key approaches that America can take to achieve this goal. Diplomatic engagement is crucial, involving direct talks with conflicting parties to negotiate a peaceful resolution. The US can leverage its global influence to facilitate dialogue and foster an environment conducive to compromise. Another strategy involves economic incentives, where the US offers financial benefits to parties that agree to a ceasefire. This approach can motivate warring factions to consider peace as a viable option. International cooperation is also vital, as the US can work with other nations and international organizations to apply collective pressure on conflicting parties. This collaborative effort can enhance the credibility and effectiveness of ceasefire negotiations. The US can also employ military de-escalation tactics, aimed at reducing tensions and creating a conducive environment for peace talks. By demonstrating a commitment to de-escalation, the US can build trust with conflicting parties. Furthermore, humanitarian assistance can play a critical role in supporting affected populations and demonstrating the US's commitment to alleviating human suffering. This approach can help create a positive atmosphere for ceasefire discussions. Strategic communication is another essential strategy, involving clear and consistent messaging to conflicting parties, regional stakeholders, and the international community. Effective communication can help manage expectations and promote a unified approach to peace. Lastly, the US can focus on post-conflict reconstruction, offering support for rebuilding and development once a ceasefire is in place. This long-term perspective can encourage parties to commit to a lasting peace.

In a decisive session held on 12 April 2026, the Iraqi parliament elected a new head of state, signaling a fresh chapter in the nation’s governance. The vote, conducted under the country’s constitutional framework, reflects the parliament’s role in steering Iraq’s political direction. The appointment comes at a time when Iraq is navigating complex internal reforms and external diplomatic challenges. Choosing a new president is expected to impact the balance of power among Iraq’s major political factions and could affect the country’s relationships with neighboring states. While the identity of the elected president was not disclosed in the source material, the parliamentary decision underscores the importance of legislative consensus in Iraq’s democratic process. Observers note that the outcome may influence upcoming policy debates, especially those related to security, economic reconstruction, and foreign investment. Analysts suggest that the new presidency could either consolidate existing alliances or introduce shifts in Iraq’s strategic priorities, depending on how the elected leader navigates the nation’s pressing challenges.

The new academic term began in Gaza in late March, but the usual bustle of students catching buses to campus has been replaced by the stark reality of displacement.Israel’s relentless campaign has turned most university buildings into rubble and shelters, forcing a shift to online learning that many students in tents cannot access due to lack of electricity, water, food and reliable internet.Against this backdrop, a glimmer of hope has emerged. In the overcrowded al‑Mawasi district of Khan Younis, the US‑based NGO Scholars Without Borders has erected a makeshift “University City,” a wooden and metal structure designed to bring students back into a real lecture hall."Our mission is to bring education closer to students in a better environment," said Hamza Abu Daqqa, the organisation’s Gaza representative.The facility houses six halls that can accommodate up to 600 students each day. Powered by solar panels, it offers internet access, improvised green spaces and even a small business incubator to help students explore entrepreneurial ideas.University City operates on a rotating weekly schedule, allocating each day to a different institution so that multiple universities can share the limited space. Priority is given to courses that require hands‑on instruction, such as practical labs and discussion‑based classes.Prominent Gaza institutions—including the Islamic University, Al‑Azhar University and the Palestine College of Nursing—have already begun using the site.For many students, this is the first time in years they have set foot in a space that feels like a real university. "When I saw this place, I was amazed," said 20‑year‑old nursing student Mariam Nasr, who fled Rafah and now travels four kilometres on foot to attend classes.Another first‑year student, Amr Muhammad, echoed the sentiment: "Being here with other students, discussing and engaging in class makes a huge difference."The broader picture remains grim. UN experts have labeled Israel’s systematic targeting of Gaza’s academic sector as “scholasticide.” More than 7,000 university students and staff have been killed or injured, and over 60 university buildings have been completely demolished, according to the Euro‑Med Human Rights Monitor.Materials for University City were sourced entirely within Gaza, a testament to the community’s resilience amid soaring costs and scarce resources. Yet the initiative is hampered by the same blockade that restricts reconstruction supplies, fuel and safe transport.Students still face daily hurdles: damaged roads, limited cash, and unreliable transport—often relying on worn‑out vehicles, donkey carts or long walks. "My father could only give me eight shekels (about $2.64) for a ride," Mariam explained, highlighting the economic strain.Even once inside the halls, challenges persist. Power outages and unstable internet make it difficult to print materials or follow online lectures, forcing many to rely on old phones and intermittent connections.Nevertheless, the atmosphere inside University City is one of determination. "For medical education, in‑person learning is essential," said Dr Essam Mughari of the Palestine College of Nursing. "Seeing students gather again restores something vital."For students like Mariam, the drive to continue studying is deeply personal. "My cousin, a nurse, was killed when an airstrike destroyed her family’s house. I study to heal others and honor her memory," she said.While University City now serves hundreds daily, thousands of Gaza’s students remain without comparable facilities. Abu Daqqa stresses that the project is only the beginning: "We have built dozens of makeshift schools, but the need is far greater. Imagine what could be done if the needed resources were allowed through."

The Gulf Cooperation Council is reassessing its security model after the brief but intense US‑Israel campaign against Iran. With American bases on Gulf soil turning the region into a target for Tehran’s missile and drone barrage, Gulf capitals are looking to diversify their defence partners beyond the United States. Iran’s lingering missile arsenal and its demand to retain control of the Strait of Hormuz remain the central security dilemma. The strait channels the bulk of Gulf oil trade, and Tehran’s insistence on keeping a foothold there was a sticking point in the cease‑fire talks scheduled to begin in Islamabad. Gulf air defences boasted a high interception rate, claiming to have neutralised more than 90% of the 2,256 drones and 563 missiles that struck the United Arab Emirates, the hardest‑hit member of the bloc. Nevertheless, the Gulf is split on how to engage Iran moving forward. A hawkish bloc led by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain favours a tougher stance, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar and others are open to restoring diplomatic ties. In a rare development, Saudi Arabia and Iran held their first official conversation since the conflict began, with foreign ministers discussing measures to lower tensions and restore regional stability. Security scholars such as Bader Mousa Al‑Saif of Kuwait University argue that Gulf states must broaden their security network, forging alliances with regional powers like Turkey and Pakistan rather than relying solely on the United States. He warned that the region needs a model that shields it from a perpetual state of war. Pre‑war trends are now accelerating: Saudi Arabia recently signed a defence pact with Pakistan, the UAE announced a partnership with India, and all three Gulf states – Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar – entered rapid defence agreements with Ukraine to counter Iranian drone threats. Talks of a “Muslim NATO” have largely faded, but a new alignment dubbed “Step”, involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan, is taking shape. The coalition’s purpose remains ambiguous, oscillating between counter‑Iran and counter‑Israel objectives, and internal rivalries complicate cohesion. The United Kingdom, which helped protect Gulf airspace during the hostilities, is also seeking deeper defence‑industrial cooperation with Saudi Arabia, as discussed by Prime Minister Keir Starmer in Jeddah. UAE political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla predicts tighter security ties with the United States and a growing willingness among Gulf states to engage with Israel on military and intelligence fronts. Analysts such as Yasmine Farouk of the International Crisis Group note that Saudi Arabia’s extensive oil infrastructure, Red Sea ports and sheer geographic size give it a strategic advantage in post‑war reconstruction, though the cost of rebuilding could strain its Vision 2030 diversification agenda. Looking ahead, the Gulf is expected to layer additional security partnerships—particularly with European nations—while investing heavily in air and missile defence, hardened ports, desalination facilities, maritime surveillance and alternative export routes. As Andreas Krieg of King’s College London observes, the United States remains the only power with a full‑scale military architecture in the Gulf, but its bases are increasingly viewed as “tripwires” rather than protective shields.

A fresh assessment released after the latest wave of Israeli airstrikes confirms that Beirut has endured extensive structural damage. The report, sourced from local authorities, outlines the breadth of destruction across residential districts and key infrastructure.While precise casualty figures remain unconfirmed, officials emphasize that the scale of the devastation will require substantial reconstruction efforts and could exacerbate the humanitarian situation in the capital.International observers note that the heightened damage underscores the escalating intensity of the conflict in the region, raising concerns about further destabilisation and the need for coordinated relief responses.

The strategic Strait of Hormuz, linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, has become the focal point of the Israel‑U.S. war on Iran that began in February. In peacetime the narrow waterway handled about 20% of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments without any tolls, but the conflict has turned it into a contested zone. After a series of Israeli and U.S. strikes, Iran retaliated by targeting merchant vessels it deemed hostile, effectively shutting the passage and triggering one of the most severe energy‑distribution crises in recent memory. While a two‑week ceasefire, brokered by Pakistan, was declared on Tuesday, Tehran has issued a set of official terms that would govern the strait moving forward. According to Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghi, safe passage will be allowed in coordination with the Iranian armed forces and subject to technical limitations. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has even published a new navigation map that pushes traffic farther north, away from the traditional route near Oman’s coast, citing the risk of anti‑ship mines. Central to Tehran’s 10‑point peace proposal is the idea of charging fees for strait usage. Iranian media report that the plan could levy up to $2 million per vessel—a sum to be shared with Oman—or a charge of $1 per barrel of oil shipped. The revenue would allegedly fund reconstruction of military and civilian infrastructure damaged by the U.S.–Israeli campaign. Oman has publicly rejected any toll scheme, with Transport Minister Said Al‑Maawali reminding that the country has already signed all relevant international maritime transport agreements that prohibit such fees. International law adds another layer of complexity. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) prohibits levying charges for mere passage through international straits, allowing fees only for services like navigation assistance or port use. Neither the United States nor Iran have ratified UNCLOS, but the principle remains a benchmark for maritime norms. Analysts suggest a possible workaround: charging for de‑mining and safety services rather than for passage itself, which could be permissible under existing legal frameworks. The proposal has sparked diplomatic pushback. At the United Nations Security Council, Bahrain led a resolution urging coordinated reopening of the strait, backed by Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan. The resolution passed with 11 of 15 votes, but was vetoed by Russia and China, who argued it unfairly targeted Iran and ignored the initial strikes. Beyond the region, the United States is unlikely to accept indefinite tolls. Former President Donald Trump, who announced the ceasefire, warned that U.S. forces would remain in the area and threatened to resume attacks if negotiations faltered. American troops are reportedly “hanging around” to assist with traffic buildup, though the extent of their operational control remains unclear. Maritime analyst C. Uday Bhaskar notes that only three to five ships have traversed the strait since the ceasefire began, underscoring the lingering uncertainty for global shippers. He adds that ship owners facing multi‑million‑dollar losses each day may ultimately acquiesce to Iran’s terms, at least temporarily. Should Iran implement a toll regime, the immediate impact would fall on Gulf oil‑producing nations, but the ripple effects could destabilize global energy markets, already strained by supply shocks. Major powers such as the United Kingdom have been coordinating with a coalition of 40 countries to explore alternative mechanisms for reopening the waterway without conceding to tolls. In sum, Iran’s proposed protocol for the Strait of Hormuz introduces a contentious new variable into an already volatile geopolitical landscape, pitting national security interests against established maritime law and the broader stability of world energy supplies.

Iran and the United States each declared a triumph after agreeing to a two‑week ceasefire that was announced just before President Donald Trump’s deadline to force Tehran’s surrender. The conflict, which began on 28 February, has already claimed 2,076 lives in U.S.–Israel strikes on Iran and has caused thousands more deaths across the region. The fighting has also shocked global energy markets, stranding oil tankers and pushing prices to unprecedented levels. Trump announced on Truth Social that the United States would halt bombing Iran after receiving a “workable” 10‑point ceasefire proposal, adding that “almost all of the various points of past contention have been agreed to.” Iran, for its part, said it would reopen the Strait of Hormuz to commercial traffic, even as some citizens denounced the government’s perceived capitulation. Both parties are set to resume Pakistan‑mediated talks in Islamabad on Friday, though analysts warn that earlier red lines may resurface. Key terms of the Tuesday agreement: the United States will suspend air strikes for two weeks, citing that it has already achieved its military objectives and is close to a “definitive agreement concerning long‑term peace.” Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, pledged to halt “defensive operations” and to allow safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, while also indicating willingness to fund reconstruction from fees collected on transiting ships. Domestic reaction in Iran remains volatile. University of Tehran professor Foad Izadi noted that the public’s pessimism stems from two prior escalations—June’s 12‑day war and the February 28 strikes—both of which occurred amid ongoing negotiations. Earlier demands: The United States had presented a 15‑point plan on 25 March, calling for a 30‑day ceasefire, immediate reopening of the Strait, Iran’s de‑commissioning of its nuclear facilities, a total ban on uranium enrichment, handover of nuclear stockpiles to the IAEA, cessation of support to regional proxies, strict limits on ballistic missiles, and a full lift of sanctions, among other items. Iran responded with a 10‑point proposal that emphasized a non‑aggression commitment from the United States, controlled passage through the Strait, acceptance of its enrichment programme, comprehensive sanctions relief, withdrawal of U.S. combat forces, compensation for war damages via shipping fees, and a binding UN Security Council resolution. Both sides have already made concessions. Iran moved from demanding a permanent ceasefire to accepting a two‑week pause, and it shifted from insisting on reparations to proposing reconstruction funding from Strait fees. The United States, meanwhile, has softened its demand for an “unconditional” Iranian surrender and has not reiterated its earlier insistence on dismantling Iran’s missile capabilities. One of the most contentious issues remains the status of Lebanon. While Pakistan’s prime minister said the ceasefire would extend to Lebanon, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu denied any such inclusion, and Israel launched a major bombing campaign in Beirut shortly thereafter, killing hundreds. Looking ahead, analysts highlight that the United States is unlikely to concede on the complete withdrawal of its roughly 50,000 troops stationed across 19 Middle Eastern sites—a demand Tehran has placed on the table. The outcome of the upcoming talks will hinge on whether Washington can accommodate Tehran’s broader political and economic requests without compromising its strategic objectives.